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The above caption of this case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding 
in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed. Throughout this brief, Madsen 
will refer to the defendant and appellant as "Prudential." 
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JURISDICTION 
Appellate Jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme Court is conferred pursuant to § 78-2-
2(3)0) of the Utah Code, The Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4). Accordingly, this Court now has jurisdiction 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. If a bank holds pledged funds and secretly earns profits on those funds, what 
statute of limitations, if any, applies? 
The standard of review is one of correctness, since the trial court's application of 
the statute of limitations presents a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, f^ 4, 979 
P.2d 823. This issue was preserved below at R. 2714-20, 3013-20, 6366, 7610-16, 
12744-7. 
2. In 1979, the Utah Legislature passed a new statute (§ 7-17-4). Did the new 
statute (§ 7-17-4 U.C.A.) cut off class members' rights to profits earned on pledged 
accounts after June 30, 1979? 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law the appellate court should 
review for correctness. N.A.R. v Elmer, 2006 UT App. 293,14, 141 P.3d 606. This 
issue was preserved at various places in the record, including R. 6872-76, 6975-84, 7258-
64,9104-12, 10838-48. 
3. Is Madsen entitled to compound interest during the time that Prudential earned 
profits by using the pledged funds? If so, for what period of time would the 
compounding continue? In the alternative, is Madsen entitled to prejudgment interest; 
and if so, for what time period? 
This issue presents a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Carlson 
Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, 2004 UT App 227, f 15, 95 P.3d 1171; 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991). This issue was preserved at R. 
3034-43, 6456-9, 7982-3, 12229-35, 12700. 
4. Was it proper for the trial court to eliminate, from the previously certified class, 
duplexes, second homes, or commercial properties; even though the contract language 
was the same as the Madsen contract? 
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in reducing the size of the 
class is a legal question reviewed de novo. Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 
331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003). This issue is preserved below at R. 5026-31, 5210-15. 
5. Should the Master be disqualified and all of this work vacated because of his ex 
parte meetings with one party? And should the Master's work be vacated if it can be 
shown that he (the Master) relied on work done by others, rather than doing the work 
himself? 
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion (perhaps as a 
matter of law) in refusing to disqualify the Master and in adopting the Master's report. 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742-3 (Utah 1990). If there was abuse of discretion, this 
Court "must vacate the order unless the error was hamiless." Id. at 741. "The standard 
2 
for determining harmless error is whether it is reasonably likely that the trial court's final 
order would have been different absent the master's improper activities." Id. at 744. 
6. Because Prudential has not provided an acceptable accounting, in a case that is 
32 years old, should this Court simplify matters and order that damages be calculated 
using the passbook savings rate of interest? 
This issue is one for the appellate court only, and hence is a question of law. 
Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71,1 P.2d 941 (1931). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34, states: 
To actions brought, to recover money or other property 
deposited with any bank, trust company or savings or loan 
corporation, association or society there is no limitation. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4(1): 
(1) A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance of a 
reserve account shall offer the borrower the following options: 
(a) The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing 
reserve account to be serviced by the lender at no charge to 
the borrower; or 
(b) The borrower may manage the payment of insurance 
premiums, taxes and other charges for his own account. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Madsen purchased a home in 1964. In order to finance the purchase, Madsen 
borrowed $16,800 from Prudential Federal Savings and Loan. The trust deed provided in 
part: 
3 
In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said note, 
the TRUSTOR agrees to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same day 
each month, budget payments estimated to equal one-twelfth of the 
annual taxes and insurance premiums; said budget payments to be 
adjusted from time to time as required, and said budget payments are 
hereby pledged to the BENEFICIARY as additional security for the 
full performance of this deed of trust and the note secured hereby. 
(R. 5.) (Emphasis added.) 
Madsen claims that Prudential invested the "pledged" funds and earned a profit. 
(R. 931.) Madsen sued for an accounting of the profits. The lawsuit was filed as a class 
action, and the class was certified. 
Early in the case, the trial court granted a summary judgment for Prudential 
dismissing the case. Thus followed the first appeal, Madsen v. Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Assn., 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977)1 (included herein as Ex. A.) In 
Madsen /, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded. The Utah 
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that: 
The pledgee has the duty to account to the pledgor for the 
increase or profits accruing to the pledgee as a result of the 
possession of the pledged chattel. Id. at 1340. 
After the decision in Madsen I (above), Prudential removed the case to federal 
court. The federal court dismissed the action. Madsen appealed. Madsen v. Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass Jn, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980).2 (Included herein as 
Ex. B.) In Madsen II, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held inter alia that: 
1
 Hereafter Madsen I 
2
 Hereafter Madsen II. 
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Since no federal controversy was disclosed on the face 
of the Madsens' state court complaint, as amended, removal 
was improper and the consolidated case must be remanded to 
state court. Id. at 803. 
After remand to the trial court, Judge Rigtrup held a bench trial. At the conclusion 
of the trial, Judge Rigtrup entered a verbal bench ruling in favor of Madsen. After the 
verbal bench ruling was issued (but before written findings could be entered) Prudential 
claimed that Judge Rigtrup was biased and should be disqualified. The presiding judge 
agreed and dismissed the case. Madsen appealed. Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Ass'n, 161 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988).3 (Included herein as Ex. C.) The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
After the case was remanded, Judge Rigtrup entered written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Included herein as Ex. D.) As part of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Ex. D.), Judge Rigtrup ruled inter alia that: 
10. Prudential should be ordered to pay to Madsen the sum of 
$134.70 for profits or earnings Prudential has realized by 
using Madsen5 s "budget" payments for the period of March 3, 
1971 to June 30, 1979. 
* * * 
12. All class issues are reserved for further proceedings. 
(R. 3003). 
After remand, the trial court appointed a Master. The Master filed his final report, 
dated March 1, 2002. (R. 10370-2, included herein as Ex. G.) As part of his final report 
(Ex. G), the Master concluded that there were 9,547 class members; and that the average 
Hereafter Madsen III. 
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damages per class member would be $105.18; resulting in a total judgment for all class 
members of $1,004,153. (R. 10371.) Based upon the Master's Report, the trial court 
entered a Final Judgment of $1,004,153 for the entire class. (R. 13842-3, included herein 
as Ex. I.) 
Madsen appealed the trial court's Final Judgment. (R. 13850-83.) As part of this 
appeal, Madsen claims that the computation of damages by the Master should have been 
higher; and that the Master failed to account for all class members. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to this appeal are set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by 
Judge Rigtrup. (See R. 2997-3001, Ex. D.) For purposes of this appeal, Madsen does not 
challenge any of the Findings entered by Judge Rigtrup. (Ex. D.) However, Madsen does 
challenge computations included in the Master's Report of March 1, 2002 (Ex. G herein). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since this case deals with funds that were on deposit with a bank or savings and 
loan corporation, there is no statute of limitations. § 78-12-34, Utah Code Ann. 
Consequently, Madsen should have been awarded the profits earned from the time the 
deposit was made in 1964. At the very least, since the deposit was made pursuant to a 
contractual requirement, Madsen is entitled to the profits accruing during the six years 
immediately prior to the filing of this action in 1975. 
In 1979, the Legislature passed the Interest on Mortgage Loan Accounts Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-17-1, et seq. And Judge Rigtrup cut off damages as of 1979 because of 
6 
the Act. However, that Act did not apply to any action filed before 1979. Furthermore, 
Prudential did not comply with the terms of the Act; and the mandate of the 1977 
Supreme Court decision had already established the law of the case in this matter. 
Prejudgment interest is appropriate in this case because the amount of the pledge is 
"ascertainable at any given time," and evidence was presented which enabled the 
calculation of damages. 
The class in this case was initially certified to include all borrowers having 
identical contract provisions with respect to money pledged for the payment of taxes and 
insurance. Late in the case, Judge Rigtrup removed duplexes, second homes and 
commercial properties from the class. By narrowing the definition of the certified class, 
the trial court not only violated the mandate, but dismissed a subclass without any notice 
to the members of the class. 
The conclusions of the Master should be disregarded because the Master has stated 
that more testing needs to be done; thus, the Master's Report is not yet fmishedl. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IS BOUND TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
As stated in the Introduction, this case has been to the Utah Supreme Court on two 
prior occasions. (See Ex. A and Ex. C.) Many of the issues before the Court on this 
appeal have already been decided on the two prior appeals. Under the doctrine of "law of 
the case/' this Court is bound by the mandates of those two prior decisions. 
7 
Law of the case terminology has been applied to a number of 
distinct sets of problems, each with a separate analysis. One branch 
of the doctrine, often called the mandate rule, dictates that 
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case 
become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent 
proceedings of that case, [citations omitted.] The lower court must 
not depart from the mandate, and any change with respect to the 
legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the appellate 
court that established it [viz. the Utah Supreme Court] or by a court 
to which it, in turn, owes obedience, [citations omitted.] In addition, 
the lower court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the 
mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-8 (1995). The truth is that this case 
is over 30 years old; and the record is thousands and thousands of pages long. 
Nevertheless, this brief can be relatively short because most of the issues have already 
been decided in Madsen I and Madsen III. 
POINT II 
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THIS CASE 
A. BACKGROUND 
Madsens took out their home loan in 1964. (Finding of Fact f^ 1.) (R. 2997. See 
Ex. D herein.) The complaint in this case was filed on March 3, 1975. (R. 1.) The trial 
court applied the four-year statute of limitations pursuant to § 78-12-25 (3), Utah Code 
Ann. ("An action may be brought within four years for relief not otherwise provided for 
by law."). Therefore, the trial court allowed damages from 1975 (date of complaint) back 
to 1971 (four-year statute of limitations) even though Madsen had been making the same 
8 
loan payments since 1964. (R. 2997-8.) Or stated in other words. Prudential was allowed 
tnjTQcket all of the profits on the pledged funds for the period of 1964 to 1971. 
This issue was preserved below at R. 2714-20, 3013-20, 6366, 7610-16, 12744-7. 
B. THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MONEY "DEPOSITED" 
IN A BANK 
Madsen claims that the applicable statute of limitations should have been § 78-12-
34,4 Utah Code Ann. which states: 
To actions brought, to recover money or other property 
deposited with any bank, trust company or savings or loan 
corporation, association or society there is no limitation. (Emphasis 
added.) 
As noted, above, the statute turns on the word "deposit." If Madsen's pledged 
funds were construed to be a "deposit," § 78-12-34 (above) would apply, and damages 
would go all the way back to 1964. However, Judge Rigtrup rejected plaintiffs claim 
that the pledged funds were a "deposit." At Conclusion of Law f 9 (R. 3003, Ex. D 
herein) Judge Rigtrup held that: 
The "budget55 account is not a "bank deposit55 within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34. 
But, the Utah Supreme Court has previously made a ruling on this specific issue. 
In Madsen I, our Supreme Court concluded that Madsen5s pledged funds were a 
"deposit.55 
4
 This statute was rescinded in 1981. However, this case was six years old by that 
time. Thus, the 1981 statute should apply. See e g Merz v. Seaman, 697 N.Y.S.2d 290 
(1999) and 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitations of Actions, § 47. 
9 
A deposit5 of money as security for the performance of a 
contract has been recognized as a valid pledge. 
Madsen /, 558 P.2d at 1339. (Emphasis and footnote added.) 
In short, the Utah Supreme Court has determined in this case that Madsen's 
monthly "pledge" was a "deposit." That mandate is binding on this Court. Since each 
monthly payment was a "deposit," the statute of limitations regarding "deposit" (§ 78-12-
34 above) should apply. 
However, if this Court concludes that Madsen's pledge was not a "deposit" (see 
above), the Court should consider the case of Conner v. Smith, 51 Utah 129, 169 P. 158, 
160 (1917). Conner analyzes statute of limitations issues for a "pledge." The Conner 
court held that: 
When property is held by the pledgee as security, he cannot assert 
that he holds it adversely to the pledgor, and thereby acquire a right 
to it under the statute of limitations. 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
The standard of review is the one of correctness, because the trial court's 
application of a statute of limitations presents a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 
52,14, 979P.2d823. 
5Compare Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT App 372, f 9, 21 
P.3d 231 ("When a statute fails to define a word, we rely on the dictionary . . .") with 
Webster }s Third New International Dictionary (the word deposit defined inter alia as 
"something given as a pledge"). Also the Oxford American College Dictionary (2002) 
defines the word deposit inter alia "a sum payable as . . . a pledge for a contract." 
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Since determining the applicable statute of limitations is purely a legal issue, there 
is no requirement to marshal evidence. If marshaling is nevertheless appropriate, 
Prudential may make the factual assertion that the pledge was never deposited into any 
identifiable account. (R. 2998.) Madsen concedes that fact. Based on this fact, 
Prudential may argue that the pledge could not be deemed a deposit. 
POINT III 
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
IF ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES, IT WOULD BE 
THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE 
A. BACKGROUND 
Madsen has argued in POINT II above, that there is no statute of limitations for 
this case. If the Court agrees with POINT II, the Court may skip this POINT III. 
However, if this Court disagrees with POINT II, above, the Court should next consider 
this POINT III. 
This issue was preserved at R. 7610-11. 
B. IF ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES. IT WOULD BE THE SIX-
YEAR STATUTE 
As noted in POINT II above, Judge Rigtrup applied a four-year statute of 
limitations pursuant to § 78-12-25(2) Utah Code Ann. ("An action . . . for relief not 
otherwise provided for by law"). However, if any statute of limitations applies (see Point 
II above), Judge Rigtrup should have applied the six-year statute of limitations. 
Specifically, § 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann. provides: 
11 
An action may be brought within six years . . . upon any contract, 
obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
The next step is to compare § 78-12-23 (cited above) with the mandate of the Supreme 
Court in Madsen /which states: 
This action is founded on a deed of trust and was brought to 
determine the . . . legal consequences pursuant to such terms. 
(Emphasis added.) 
558P.2dat 1338. 
In summary, the mandate of the Supreme Court clearly and specifically holds that 
"this action" was "founded" on "an instrument in writing" (viz. the trust deed). Thus 
Judge Rigtrup violated both the letter and the spirit of the mandate by not applying the 
six-year statute of limitations. 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
The standard of review is one of correctness, because the trial court's application 
of a statute of limitations present a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, [^4, 979 
P.2d823. 
As stated above, there should be no need to marshal evidence on the legal issue of 
the applicable statute of limitations. But if marshaling is required, Prudential may argue 
that there is nothing in the contract which explicitly requires Prudential to pay the interest, 
earnings, or profits it derived from the pledge. (R. 152.) Prudential may go on to argue 
that there was, therefore, no contractual breach. 
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POINT IV 
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
IT WAS AN ERROR OF LAW FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
END DAMAGES AS OF 1979 
A. BACKGROUND 
Madsens took out their home loan in 1964. The duration of the loan was for 25 
years (or until 1989). This lawsuit was filed in 1975. Or stated in other words, this 
lawsuit seeks damages for the period of 1964 to 1989. 
However, the trial court cut off damages for the period from 1964 to 1971. See 
Points II and III above. The trial court also cut off damages for the period 1979 to 1989. 
This Point IV deals with damages from 1979 to 1989. 
In 1979 (two years after the Court's decision in Madsen I) the Utah Legislature 
passed a new statute titled the Interest on Mortgage Loan Accounts Act (§ 7-17-1 et seq. 
U.C.A.) There have been some amendments since the original 1979 act. A copy of the 
act as amended by 1985 (the date of the trial below) is included as Exhibit J. 
Section 4 of the original act states as follows: 
(1) A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance of a 
reserve account shall offer the borrower the following options: 
(a) The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing 
reserve account6 to be serviced by the lender at no charge to 
the borrower; or 
6
 § 7-17-2(5) defines "reserve account" as follows: "'Reserve account' means any 
account, whether denominated . . . pledge . . . or otherwise . . . whereby the borrower 
agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender . . [of] taxes, insurance premiums or 
other charges . . ." 
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(b) The borrower may manage the payment of insurance 
premiums, taxes and other charges for his own account. 
Pursuant to the above statute, Prudential sent a form letter to Madsen and other 
class members in July of 1979. That form letter states: 
NOTICE TO HOMEOWNER 
RESERVE ACCOUNTS FOR PAYMENT OF TAXES AND INSURANCE 
As of July 1, 1979, Prudential Federal Savings will no longer require 
a reserve account in conjunction with your mortgage loan for the 
payment of real estate property taxes, insurance premiums, or other 
charges. You may now choose one of the following two options: 
A. You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided 
for in your loan documents to be deposited in a non interest 
bearing reserve account. We will continue to provide you the 
service of paying your property taxes and/or insurance 
premiums at no cost as they become due; or, 
B. You may elect to assume the legal responsibility for the 
payment of these assessments and pay your own real estate 
property taxes, insurance premiums and other charges as they 
become due. 
If you choose Option A, no response is necessary. We will continue 
to provide the services of paying these assessments without cost to 
you. If you choose Option B, the enclosed card must be signed and 
returned to our office by September 1, 1979. 
(R. 3007.) (Emphasis added.) 
In summary, based upon the letter (above) and based upon § 7-17-4 (above) Judge 
Rigtmp cut off damages as of July of 1979 even though Madsen and other class members 
continued to pay pledged funds for several years after 1979. Thus Conclusion of Law ]f f 
states: 
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Damages terminate on June 30, 1979 by reason of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-17-4. (R. 3002, Ex. D herein) 
This issue was preserved, inter alia, at R. 6872-76, 6975-84, 7258-64, 9104-12, 
10838-48. 
B. BY ITS OWN TERMS. THE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
INSTANT LAWSUIT. 
As described above, the legislature passed a new statute in 1979 (Interest on 
Mortgage Loan Accounts Act). Based upon § 7-17-4 of that Act, Judge Rigtrup cut off 
damages as of 1979. (See Conclusion of Law | 5, R. 3002.) However, § 7-17-10 of the 
Act states: 
The provisions of this act shall apply: 
(1) to all reserve accounts; and 
(2) to all actions filed after January 1,1979, to recover interest 
on or other compensation for the use of the funds on any reserve 
account whether or not the reserve accounts were established 
prior to or subsequent to July 1,1979, (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, according to the specific language of the statute (above), the act only applies 
to actions filed after January 1, 1979. But, the instant lawsuit was filed in 1975, four 
years prior to that 1979 deadline. Thus, the act cannot apply. See Andreason v Felsted, 
2006UTApp 188,^11, 137 P.3dl: 
When we engage in statutory interpretation, "we are compelled to 
give the statutory language meaning and to assume that each term in 
the statute was used advisedly." (Citation omitted.) 
The case of Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995) is also 
on point: 
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Clearly, the first and last sentences of [the statute] are patently 
inconsistent. . . . This Court will not construe a statute in such a 
way as to render certain viable parts meaningless and void. 
If this Court goes beyond the plain words of the statute to examine the legislative 
history/ the court will be squarely faced with the comments of the sponsor of the bill: 
It is very clear and this has been established in the Senate and the 
argument is without doubt that the Madsen case is not included in 
this . . . The Madsen suit is not encumbered in any way. It can go 
ahead with logical conclusion. We don't wish to interfere with that. 
Legislative Proceedings on Senate Bill 85, Vol. II, 2/14/79, p.19. (R. 3271-2.) 
In summary, Madsen's rights to damages after 1979 could not be cut off by 
§ 7-17-4 Utah Code Ann. because that statute only applies to "actions filed after June 1, 
1979." But, this lawsuit was filed in 1975. 
C. PRUDENTIAL CANNOT RELY ON THE STATUTE BECAUSE 
PRUDENTIAL DID NOT DEPOSIT MADSEN'S PAYMENTS INTO A 
"NON-INTEREST BEARING" ACCOUNT 
Turning again to the letter sent by Prudential to Madsen and other class members 
(R. 3007, If A above), the letter reads in part: 
You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided for in 
your loan document to be deposited in a noninterest bearing account. 
(Emphasis added.) 
But, did Prudential really "deposit" the money "in a non-interest bearing account" 
as promised by Prudential's letter? The analysis begins with Judge Rigtrup's Finding of 
Fact f 5, which states that: 
7
 See Utah Dept of Environmental Quality v Wind River Petroleum, 881 P'.2d 
869, 872-3 (Utah 1994). 
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Upon receiving each monthly payment, Prudential 
immediately deposited the entire check into its general operating 
account. (R. 2998.) (Emphasis added.) (See Ex. D.) 
Madsen hired an expert witness, Andrew Carr Conway. Mr. Conway has 
impeccable credentials. He is a Certified Fraud Examiner, a Certified Financial 
Investigator, and a Certified Public Accountant. (See R. 11883-4.) Mr. Conway has had 
thirty years of experience with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal 
Revenue Service. Mr. Conway's testimony8 on the issue is as follows: 
I have examined a form letter which was sent by Prudential in July of 
1979 to persons who had borrowed money from Prudential to 
purchase homes (class members). . . . I have also examined a 
document titled Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (March 
22, 1990). 
* # # 
Based on the above documents and my review of the 1990 Annual 
Report for Olympus Capital Corporation (a consolidated entity 
including Prudential), it is my opinion, as a cash management issue, 
and as an accounting matter related to the classification of restricted 
cash, Prudential did not deposit the funds designated for taxes 
and insurance with Madsen's monthly payments into a "non-
interest bearing reserve account" after July 1, 1979 (as promised 
in the July 1979 letter). Rather, (contrary to the representations in 
the 1979 form letter,) after July 1, 1979, until at least May 22, 1990 
(the date that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed) 
Prudential deposited Madsen's monthly "budget payment" into 
Prudential's general operating account and Prudential invested 
surplus funds from the general operating account at a profit. 
(R. 11876-9.) (Emphasis added.) 
8
 Prudential filed a Motion to Strike the Conway Affidavit. In response, Judge 
Dever ruled that "Mr. Conway's statements on accounting procedures [are] allowed, the 
remaining portions in the Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit are striken. (R. 1277L) 
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The summary of all the above is that Prudential's form letter ( | A above) 
promised to "deposit" the prepayments for taxes and insurance into a "non-interest 
bearing account." But that was a lie. Prudential did not deposit the money into a "non-
interest bearing account." Rather, Prudential deposited the money in its "general 
operating account," and Prudential invested surplus funds from this account to earn a 
profit. See Conway Affidavit above. See also Finding of Fact ^ 9 (R. 2999, Ex. D. 
herein). 
It is also important to note that the statute required Prudential to advise class 
members that the form letter was sent out "pursuant to this Act." [viz. pursuant to §7-17-
4(2).] Of course, Prudential's form letter does not advise class members that the letter 
was sent "pursuant" to § 7-17-1 et seq. (See f^ A above.) Therefore, class members did 
not have any opportunity to refer to the statute in order to clarify any ambiguity. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the appellate court should 
review for correctness. N.A.R., Inc. v. Elmer, 2006 UT App 293, ft, 141 P.3d 606. 
The only factual issue may involve Conway's statement (above) that Prudential did 
not deposit the pledge into a non-interest bearing account. However, there is no contrary 
fact evidence to marshal. Prudential merely argued that Conway's affidavit should not be 
considered because of technical considerations, for example, that it contained legal 
conclusions. R. 12014. Prudential went on to assert that the affidavit was irrelevant, in 
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that it addressed "Prudential's internal accounting procedures." R. 12023. Prudential 
thus acknowledged that this statement does not present a relevant factual issue. 
POINT V 
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
PRUDENTIAL MUST PAY PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Master computed the "net" profits which Prudential had realized by investing 
Madsen5s pledged funds. The trial court awarded Madsen those cumulative earnings for 
the years 1971 to 1979. However, the trial court refused to grant any prejudgment interest 
on those amounts. (See Conclusions of Law, ^ 10 and 13, R. 3003, at Ex. D. herein.) 
This issue is preserved at R. 3034-43, 6456-7, 7982-3, 12229-35, 12700. 
B. TRIAL COURT RULINGS 
Judge Rigtrup awarded prejudgment interest often percent on the damage award 
from the date of the trial (1985) to the date of the entry of judgment (2006) (R 3003, 
Ex. D herein at <|[ 13 ) However, Judge Rigtrup refused to grant any prejudgment interest 
for the years prior to 1985 because: 
Plaintiffs shall not be allowed interest for any time prior to trial, for 
the reasons that the damages were not calculable before trial, that 
damage calculation at trial was subject to divergent evidence and 
viewpoints, especially between the parties' expert witnesses, that 
damages required a determination by the Court and that the Court 
was required to select one method of calculation from among several 
alternatives presented by the experts. 
R. 3003-4, Exhibit D herein at f 13. 
However, at a much later date, Judge Stirba ruled that: 
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Judge Rigtrup's award to plaintiffs of the simple interest at the 
annual rate of 10% on damages from the date of the conclusion of 
trial but prior to the entry of judgment, is hereby vacated on the 
ground a judgment is entered when the judgment is actually signed 
and entered, and an award of prejudgment [interest] is, therefore, 
inappropriate. 
Order of January 20, 1998 (R. 6794, Ex. F). 
In summary, based upon the rulings of Judge Rigtrup and Judge Stirba, no 
prejudgment interest was awarded. 
C. ARGUMENT 
The law on prejudgment interest has been stated as follows: 
A prejudgment interest award is proper when "the damage is 
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the 
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time." 
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah App. 5, f 24, 994 P.2d 817, 823. (Emphasis added.) 
Turning now to the mandate of the Supreme Court, in this very case, we find the 
following language: 
]I]t [is] of no consequence that the amount of [Madsen's pledge] 
may vary during the existence of the pledge. The amount is 
ascertainable at any given time, and thus the lien is perfected as to 
amount. 
Madsen I dit 1339. (Emphasis added.) 
Or, stated in other words, the Supreme Court has concluded in this very case that 
the amount of the pledge is "ascertainable at any given time." See Madsen I. Since the 
amount of the pledge is "ascertainable at any given time," the Lefavi test (above) is 
satisfied, and prejudgment interest should be awarded. 
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D. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question 
of law which we [the appellate court] review for correctness. Carlson Distributing Co v. 
Salt Lake Brewing Co. L.C, 2004 UTApp 227, f l5 , 15P.3d 1171. 
An issue of law needs no marshaling. But should marshaling be appropriate, 
Prudential would probably rely on Judge Rigtrup's factual characterization (see quote on 
p. 19).9 
POINT VI 
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
DAMAGES SHOULD BE COMPOUNDED AND THE COMPOUNDING 
SHOULD CONTINUE TO THE PRESENT DAY 
A. BACKGROUND 
The trial court allowed damages from 1971 to 1979.10 During this window of 1971 
to 1979, the trial court computed separate damages for each year, and the Court 
compounded the interest each year from 1971 to 1979. No compound interest was 
allowed after 1979. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Ex. D herein.) 
This issue is preserved at R. 6457-9. 
9
 However, Judge Rigtrup incorrectly applied the law to these facts. See Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064 ("Where, as here, damages were complete as 
of the day the property was transferred to the REIT and the jury based its award of 
damages on competent testimony from an appraiser who used generally accepted 
principles in determining the market value of the real property, an award of prejudgment 
interest is appropriate.'5) 
10
 Madsen has argued in Point II and III above that the trial court should have 
allowed damages prior to 1971 and Madsen has argued in Point IV, above, that the trial 
court should have allowed damages after 1979. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN COMPOUNDING DAMAGES 
FROM 1971 TO 1979 
According to the mandate of the Supreme Court in this case: 
[Tjhe secured party may hold as additional security any increase or 
profits (except money) received from the collaterals, but money so 
received, unless remitted to the debtor, shall be applied in reduction 
of the secured obligation . . . 
Madsen I at 1340. (Emphasis added.) 
But Prudential violated the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court by failing to apply profits 
from the pledged funds "in reduction of the secured obligation." 
In short, Prudential earned a double profit from Madsen's pledged funds. First 
Prudential earned a "profit" by investing Madsen's pledged funds. But Prudential earned 
a second profit by failing to reduce the overall loan balance by the profits earned on 
Madsen's pledged funds. Since Prudential was earning a double profit on Madsen's 
pledged funds, the remedy is to award Madsen compound interest. Thus, in Finding of 
Fact f 14, the trial court ruled: 
The Court finds it appropriate under the facts of this case to 
compound on an annual basis. The Court finds that Prudential must 
disgorge these compounded profits in order to make Madsen whole. 
(R. 2999.) 
The case of Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 577 (1950) is 
in accord. The Farnsworth court stated: 
If defendants had paid plaintiff the interest when due, he could have 
reloaned it to them, or could have loaned it to any one else . . . The 
plaintiff therefore was as much entitled to interest upon the unpaid 
interest as though it had been paid to him when due and he had 
reloaned it.. . (Emphasis in original.) 
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Comment 207(2) to the Restatement of Trusts (1959) leads to a similar result: 
If the trustee uses trust funds in his own business and it does not 
appear how much he has earned thereon, he is ordinarily chargeable 
with compound interest on the ground that he probably received a 
return from the trust fund so used at least equal to compound 
interest. 
C. COMPOUND INTEREST SHOULD ALSO BE AWARDED FOR THE 
YEARS 1964 TO 1971 
Madsen has argued in Point II above that damages should also have been awarded 
from 1964 to 1971. For reasons stated, above, any damages awarded from 1964 to 1971 
should likewise be compounded. 
D. COMPOUND INTEREST SHOULD ALSO BE AWARDED FOR YEARS 
AFTER 1979 
Madsen has argued in Point IV above that damages should also have been awarded 
after 1979. For reasons stated above, any damages awarded after 1979 should likewise be 
compounded. 
E. COMPOUNDING OF OLD DAMAGES SHOULD CONTINUE AFTER 1979 
EVEN IF THE COURT DOES NOT AWARD NEW DAMAGES AFTER 
1979 
According to the trial court, Prudential owed Madsen $134.70 as of 1979. But 
according to the trial court, Prudential still owes Madsen the same $134.70 as of 2006. 
The problem is that the trial court has not followed the mandate of the Supreme Court. 
According to the Supreme Court, Prudential should have reduced Madsen's 
mortgage balance by $134.70 as of 1979. (See f B above.) Of course, if Madsen's 
mortgage balance had been reduced by $134.70 in 1979, the loan would have been paid 
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off earlier and Madsen's interest payments after 1979 would have been less. Or stated in 
other words, Prudential has continued to earn profits on Madsen's $134.70 from 1979 to 
2006. But according to the mandate of the Supreme Court, profits earned on the $134.70 
belong to Madsen. The only remedy is to allow the interest on the $134.70 to compound 
each year from 1979 until the judgment is paid. 
F. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
Issues regarding interest are conclusions of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. No particular deference should be paid to the trial court rulings. Christensen 
v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991). 
Issues of law do not require marshaling. If marshaling is appropriate, the only fact 
issue would seem to be whether Prudential has ever reduced Madsen's loan balance by 
the annual earnings on the pledged funds. (See p. 22 above.) Madsen is aware of no facts 
to support such a contention. 
POINT VII 
ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REMOVING DUPLEXES, SECOND HOMES, 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, ETC. FROM THE CLASS 
A. BACKGROUND 
On June 14, 1977, Judge Croft certified a class consisting of 
[A] 11 persons who are presently parties to trust deed contracts with 
defendant wherein the contract provides that: 
* * * 
"In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said note, the 
trustor agrees to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same day each 
month, budget payments estimated to equal one-twelfth of the annual 
taxes and insurance premiums; said budget payments to be adjusted 
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from time to time as required, and said budget payments are hereby 
pledged to the beneficiary as additional security for the full 
performance of this deed of trust and the note secured thereby. . . ." 
(R. 640.) (Emphasis added.) 
On September 3, 1985, Judge Rigtrup reconfirmed Judge Croft's class certification 
order above. Specifically, Judge Rigtrup ruled that: 
[T]he memorandum decision of Judge Croft dated June 14, 1977, is 
hereby reconfirmed. (R. 2027.) 
However, in December 1996, Judge Rigtrup narrowed the class definition. 
Specifically, the Court stated: 
The Court will certify as to class . . . single family, owner- occupied 
residential primary residence borrowers . . . (R. 5522.) 
According to Judge Rigtrup's 1996 revision, duplexes, tri-plexes, second homes (or 
cabins) and corporate owned homes were excluded. 
Judge Rigtrup's rationale for narrowing the class (as described above) was that: 
My reasoning between the non-occupied or commercial kinds of 
loans is where they are either holding rental property or apartments 
or commercial kinds of loans, they may have an interest to go back 
and borrow more money. And so they'd be concerned with the 
relationship with Prudential in terms of being able to go back to in 
the well. A homeowner probably isn't really going to consider it 
because you are trying to get the best deal you can and buy yourself a 
home. (R. 5523.) 
This issue is preserved at R. 5026-31, 5210-15. 
B. THERE IS NO CASELAW TO SUPPORT JUDGE RIGTRUP'S 
NARROWING OF THE CLASS 
Neither Judge Rigtrup nor Prudential has ever cited a single case which holds that 
a court can exclude some parties from a class on the guess that they might not want to be 
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part of the class action. To the contrary, see e.g. Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1357 
(10th Cir. 1981): "It is not fatal if some members of the class might prefer not to have 
violations of their rights remedied." (Internal quotations omitted.) 
C. ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT, OWNERS 
OF DUPLEXES. SECOND HOMES AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES 
SHOULD BE PART OF THE CLASS BECAUSE THEY SIGNED 
IDENTICAL CONTRACTS. 
Again, the answer to this question is found by turning to the mandate of the Utah 
Supreme Court. According to that mandate: 
The action is founded upon terms of a deed of trust; and was 
brought to determine the status of the parties, and the legal 
consequences pursuant to such terms. (Emphasis added.) 
Madsen I, 558 P.2d at 1338. 
And according to the mandate of the Supreme Court, the "legal consequences" of the 
Madsen contract are as follows: 
If from the use of the property pledged profits are derived, the 
pledgee [Prudential] must . . . account therefor to the pledgor. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id., 558P.2dat 1340. 
The point is that the Utah Supreme Court has now issued a mandate which has 
construed the terms of a specific contract; and approximately 10,000 Utah citizens had an 
identical contract with Prudential. According to the above mandate Prudential must 
account to each pledgor if the pledgor has a contract identical to the Madsen 
contract. In summary, Judge Rigtrup failed to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme 
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Court when he excluded duplexes and other commercial properties from the class - even 
though they had signed identical contracts. 
As a final matter, Rule 23(e) U.R.C.P provides that: 
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without 
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such 
manner as the court directs. (Emphasis added.) 
The above Rule ties in with Rule 23(c)(4)(B), which states: 
When appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and 
each subclass treated as a class. 
In effect, Judge Rigtrup created a separate subclass of homeowners who lived in 
duplexes, or other commercial properties. Then, twenty years after the class was 
certified, Judge Rigtrup dismissed the entire subclass without sending the notice required 
by Rule 23(e) (above). 
Suppose that a duplex owner had received a letter from the court explaining that 
duplexes had been dismissed from the class. At that point the duplex owner could have 
filed a separate and independent action to collect or the duplex owner might have filed a 
motion to intervene. But, because there was no notice from the court, duplex owners had 
no opportunity to protect themselves. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its decision 
on class certification is a legal question reviewed de novo. Parker v Time Warner 
Entertainment Co , 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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There is no need to marshal evidence pertaining to a legal issue. However, should 
marshaling need to be addressed, there is no evidence in the record supporting the factual 
basis Judge Rigtrup gave (see f^ A above) for his decision to narrow the class. 
POINT VIII 
THE MASTER SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED AND 
ALL OF HIS WORK VACATED 
A. BACKGROUND 
The trial, conducted by Judge Rigtrup, computed damages only for Madsens, 
individually. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Preamble and Conclusion 
Tf 12, R. 2994, 3003.) (See Ex. D. herein.) After the trial was completed, the trial court 
appointed a Special Master. The job of the Master was to compute damages for all class 
members. Over a period of approximately ten years, the Master issued various 
preliminary reports. (R. 4068-71, 5384-7, 9339-55.) The Master's final report was 
issued on March 1, 2002 (Rl 0370-72 and Ex. G herein); and the Final Judgment was 
based entirely11 on that March 1, 2002 Report. 
This issue was preserved at R. 9645-51, 10462-4. 
11
 The Final Judgment entered on December 13, 2004 states in part: "[PJursuant 
to the Master's Fifth Report. . . judgment is entered . . . in the amount of 
$1,004,153.00 . . r (R. 13429.) (Emphasis added.) cf. Final Judgment, entered June 1, 
2006. (R. 13842. See Ex. I.) 
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B. THE MASTER SECRETLY GAVE HIS REPORT TO PRUDENTIAL 
BEFORE THE REPORT WAS GIVEN TO MADSEN OR THE COURT 
James Loebbecke was a member of the Board of Directors of Prudential (then 
Olympus Bank) up until 1985. After 1985, James Loebbecke became the designated 
expert witness for Prudential. 
In the course of discovery it became apparent that Mr. Loebbecke was involved in 
at least three ex parte meetings with the Master (Ed Erickson). (R. 9657-63.) 
Several courts have disqualified a Master based upon such ex parte meetings. See 
e.g. Plumb v State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990); Cobell v Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); and Jenkins v Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
But the instant case is much stronger than Plumb, Cobell and Jenkins, and other 
similar ex parte cases. In Plumb, Cobell, and Jenkins, we simply know that ex parte 
meetings were held; however, nothing is known about what happened at those ex parte 
meetings. But, in the instant case, we know what happened during the ex parte meeting 
between the Master (Ed Erickson) and James Loebbecke (Prudential's expert witness). 
Specifically, we know that the Master (Ed Erickson) made a private deal to show his 
report to James Loebbecke (Prudential's expert witness) before the report was given to 
Madsen's attorney or the Judge. After one of those ex parte meetings, Mr. Loebbecke 
made the following hand written notes: 
Ed [Erickson - The Master] will draft his findings for a meeting with 
attorneys. Will share with me first. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 9672.) 
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Why would the Master show his report to Prudential's expert witness (Loebbecke) 
before he showed the report to Madsen's attorney or to the Judge? Was the Master doing 
a special favor for Prudential? Did the Master have special friends at Prudential? Did 
Prudential make some secret promises to the Master? Of course, no one will ever know. 
But the public can have no confidence in such secret meetings and private deals between 
Prudential and the Master. 
The above conduct also squarely violates Rule 53(e)(5), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which states: 
Before filing his report a master may submit a draft thereof to 
counsel for all parties [not the expert witness for one of the parties] 
for the purpose of receiving their suggestions. (Emphasis added.) 
C. THE MASTER HAS NEVER EVEN SEEN THE BASIC DOCUMENTS 
WHICH FORM THE FOUNDATION FOR HIS REPORT AND THE 
FOUNDATION FOR THE FINAL JUDGMENT 
On January 2, 2002, the Court entered the following Order: 
The Master shall, within 60 days of this order, produce to the Court a 
report giving the Master's final statistical calculation of aggregate 
class damages. (R. 10201.) 
Pursuant to the above Order, the Master sent the following Report12 to the Court on 
March 1,2002. 
This letter is our Report to the Court as required by the Court 
in its Order dated January 2, 2002. 
* * * 
To accomplish this objective I met with Brad Slack at 
Washington Mutual to review the data base that he had prepared of 
12
 This entire Report of March 1, 2002 is included herein as Ex. G. 
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the loan origination cards. This data base was prepared by Mr. Slack 
and other Washington Mutual Bank employees under his direction, 
as outlined in his August 7, 2000 affidavit filed with the Court. This 
process resulted in a data base of 14,482 loan cards. (R. 10370.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
As described in the Master's March 1, 2002 Report (above), the Master did not do 
the work to create the database of 14,482 loan cards. Rather, the work was done 
exclusively by employees of Prudential (Brad Slack). The August 7, 2000 Affidavit of 
Brad Slack (discussed above) explained how he (Brad Slack) created the database of 
14,482 cards. 
I physically sorted through over 70,000 loan origination cards and 
identified over 10,000 loan cards reflecting loans that may be within 
the class defined in this action. This process took over 600 hours 
(R. 8493.) 
Finally, it is crucial to note the Master's Final Report of March 1, 2002 (R. 10370, 
Ex. G) states: 
I [Ed Erickson, the Master] have not yet performed testing to 
determine if all [70,000] loan cards have been properly segregated 
between class members and non-members of the class. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In summary, the Master has never seen the 70,000 loan cards and has never done 
testing to determine how many class members were in that pool of 70,000 loan cards. 
The only person who has ever seen the 70,000 loan cards is Brad Slack, an employee of 
Prudential. A Final Judgment should not be based upon the work of Prudential 
employees which has never been seen or tested by the Master. 
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D. THE MASTER'S CLAIM THAT HE HAD DONE A "LIMITED AMOUNT 
OF TESTING" WAS INCORRECT 
As described in % C above, the Master has never seen or tested the original pool of 
70,000 loan cards. Rather, it was a Prudential employee (Brad Slack) who sorted the 
70,000 loan origination cards to end up with a "data base" of 14,482 class members. 
However, the Master did claim that he had done "a limited amount of testing" of 
the "data base" of 14,482. Thus, the Master's Final Report of March 1, 2002 (R. 10370, 
Ex. G) states: 
It should be noted that I have only performed a limited amount of 
testing of this data base [14,482 loan cards], primarily in obtaining a 
sample of 50 loan cards to respond to plaintiff counsel's request of 
December 27, 2000. (Emphasis added.) 
In order to evaluate this claim (viz. "I have . . . performed a limited amount of 
testing.") Madsen employed Andrew Carr Conway, Sr. Mr. Conway is a Certified Public 
Accountant, a Certified Fraud Examiner, and a Certified Financial Investigator. Mr. 
Conway's experience includes thirty years with the Internal Revenue Service and the 
Securities Exchange Commission. Mr. Conway gave a total of four affidavits on various 
issues in the case. (R. 11862-84, 12156-62; 12468-72; and 12605-13.) However, the 
Conway affidavit of September 25, 2003 analyzes the Master's claim that: 
I have only performed a limited amount of testing of this data base, 
primarily in obtaining a sample of 50 loan cards to respond to 
plaintiff counsel's request of December 27, 2000. (R. 10370.) (See 
above.) 
32 
Mr. Conway has given the following testimony13 in response to the claim of "a 
limited amount of testing." 
That process of picking up and delivering cards is best described as 
an "errand boy." There is absolutely no basis in the accounting 
profession to label that process as "testing" sufficient to produce 
sufficient relevant data. First of all, a sample of 50 cards from a 
universe of 70,000 cards is much too small a sample to do any 
legitimate testing. But if the Master wanted to attempt some type of 
testing, he would have applied examination procedures, including the 
application of certain mathematical formulas, either to produce his 
own statistical calculation or to test Prudential's calculations, to 
those 50 cards. The report dated March 1, 2002 does not include any 
evidence that the Master performed any examination procedures 
including the application of mathematical computations to the 50 
card sample. Indeed there is no evidence, based on the Report, that 
the Master even read the cards. 
* * * 
In summary, it was deceitful for the Master to pretend that he 
had done a "limited amount of testing" when there was in reality no 
statistical "testing" of any kind, based on his Report dated March 1, 
2002 and the related historical record in the case. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
E. THE MASTER HAS ADMITTED THAT HIS MARCH L 2002 REPORT 
WHICH FORMS THE BASIS FOR THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS NOT 
YET FINISHED 
As noted in f^ A, above, the Final Judgment in this case is based entirely on the 
Master's Report of March 1, 2002. (See Ex. G herein.) However, the Master, himself, 
has acknowledged that his March 1, 2002 report is not yet finished. 
13
 Prudential filed a Motion to Strike the Conway Affidavit. In response, Judge 
Dever ruled that "Mr. Conway's statements on accounting procedures [are] allowed, the 
remaining portions in the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavit are stricken. (R. 12771.) 
Prudential did not file a counter-affidavit. 
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On September 12, 2003, the Master wrote a letter to Judge Dever (R. 12760-62, 
included as Ex. H herein). As part of that letter, the Master stated: 
I was careful to point out, both on page 1 and page 3 of my Report, 
that the loan data base had not been extensively tested. 
* * * 
As I stated in my letter to Mr. DeBry of April 23, 2003 . . . uof 
course, as this matter progresses to the point where damages are 
distributed to class members, we will perform additional testing 
to confirm proper identification of class members and 
completeness of the data base." 
* * * 
I have consistently stated . . . that only a limited amount of 
testing had been done and more testing would be required! 
(Emphasis added.) 
Obviously, a Final Judgment should not be based upon a Master's Report which 
states that more testing would be required. Or stated in other words, the Final 
Judgment should only be entered after all of the testing is done. 
F. THE MASTER'S FINAL REPORT IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT 
INCLUDE "EVIDENCE" OR "EXHIBITS" 
As described in ^f C and D above, a major defect in the Master's Final Report is 
that the Master has never seen the 70,000 loan origination cards which form the 
foundation of this entire case. But, all of that confusion and delay could have been 
avoided if the 70,000 loan cards had been filed with the Court as required by Rule 
53(e)(1), U.R.CJP. which states: 
The master shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him 
by the order of reference . . . He shall file the report with the clerk of 
the court and in an action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise 
directed by the order of reference, shall file with it a transcript of the 
proceeding and of the evidence and the original exhibits. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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However, in violation of Rule 53(e)(1) (above) the Master's Final Report of March 
1, 2002 (Exhibit G) did not include any "evidence" or any "exhibits." Rather, the Final 
Report of March 1, 2002 simply contains three pages of conclusions. (R. 10370-2.) 
Because of the failure to file "exhibits" or "evidence," plaintiffs filed a Motion that 
the Master Complete the Report of March L 2002 (R. 10572.) The above motion 
requested copies of specific documents which the Master had used in performing his 
calculations as per the March 1, 2002 report. 
In response to plaintiffs motion (above) Judge Dever ruled on January 23, 2004 
that: 
The Master's report is complete. The Order signed by the Court 
directed the Master to provide a "Final statistical calculation of the 
aggregate class damages." (Order January 2, 2002.) The Master has 
done this. (R. 10371.) 
The Rule does not require that the Master file with the Court 
each and every documents used in the statistical plan submitted to 
the Court. It is the statistical plan that is the critical item and that has 
been accepted by the court. [Madsens'] Motion is denied. 
(R. 12766.) 
According to Judge Dever's ruling (above): "It is the statistical plan that is the 
critical item." But statistical plans are based upon raw data. And, that data exists on 
pieces of paper (or microfilm or microchips). According to Judge Dever's ruling, 50,000 
Utah citizens will be bound by the Master's "statistical plan"; but no one should be 
allowed to see the pieces of paper that contain the raw data which formed the basis for the 
"statistical plan." 
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However, Rule 53(e)(1) (above) does not give the trial court any discretion. Rule 
53(e)(1) is clear and mandatory ("shall file . . . evidence . . . and exhibits"). (Emphasis 
added.) 
The reasoning behind the rule (filing of exhibits) is explained in the federal case of 
Shafer v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 277 F.3d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 2002): 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in non-jury 
actions such as this one, "the court shall accept the master's findings 
of fact unless clearly erroneous." Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2). We 
interpret this rule as imposing an independent obligation on the 
district court to review the Special Master's factual findings for clear 
error. . . . This duty includes examining all relevant evidence, 
including in some cases the hearing transcripts in their entirety. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Obviously, in the case at bar, the trial court was not able to "examine all relevant 
evidence" because no evidence and no documents were filed with the Master's March 1, 
2002 Report. 
G. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion (perhaps as a 
matter of law) in refusing to disqualify the Master and in adopting the Master's report. 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742-3 (Utah 1990). If there was abuse of discretion, this 
Court "must vacate the order unless the error was harmless." Id. at 741. "The standard 
for determining harmless error is whether it is reasonably likely that the trial court's final 
order would have been different absent the master's improper activities." Id. at 744. 
There appears to be no evidence contradicting the basic facts set forth above, 
including the ex parte contacts. These primary facts are admitted by the Master. 
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Likewise, there is no evidence contradicting Mr. Conway's more conclusory facts. As 
reviewed on page 18 above, Prudential merely argued that Mr. Conway's affidavit 
contained legal conclusions or irrelevant facts. 
Although there appears to be no contrary factual evidence, the Master did give 
reasons for his ex parte contacts and for his failure to do statistically significant testing. 
As to ex parte contacts, the Master wrote the following in his letter to Judge 
Burton dated September 26, 2001 (R. 9700-03): 
At a meeting with counsel of both plaintiff and defendant 
present, it was proposed and agreed that the Master would test the 
sample of 400 borrowers previously conducted by Prudential 
personnel. . . My recollection is that we discussed the fact this 
would require us to meet with Prudential's representatives . . . 
(R. 9700.) 
Throughout my CPA career, anytime I have tested work performed 
by others it has always been my practice to discuss with those who 
performed the work any exceptions I believe I have found. I have 
found this to be absolutely necessary since, on occasion, I or my staff 
may believe we have identified an error or exception, but after 
obtaining additional information based on discussions with the 
parties involved it becomes clear that no exception or error had 
occurred. Since this has been my practice, I assume that Mr. 
Loebbecke's notes referring to me discussing a draft of my findings 
with him first would relate to this process of reviewing and 
confirming any potential exceptions noted in Prudential's work. 
(R. 9701.) 
Prudential would argue that this shows that the ex parte contact was not wrong, but only 
standard procedure 
Regarding the Master's failure to do statistically significant testing, the Master 
wrote the following in his letter to Judge Burton dated March 20, 2002 (R. 10484-6): 
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I will reiterate that my firm did test the sample work performed by 
Washington Mutual, as described in my December 31, 1996 report to 
the Court. We tested 20 of the 400 sample records and found two 
minor exceptions, as noted in our December 31, 1996 report. . . . 
This had a small impact on the interest portion of the calculation but 
no affect on the damage portion. The other error noted in our testing 
resulted in a $6.44 difference . . . (R. 10484.) 
[S]amples cannot, by definition, produce an exact answer. An exact 
answer can only be obtained when sampling is set aside and all 
records are categorized. . . . The actual number is 98.95 % of the 
sample estimate. If nothing else, this provides additional evidence 
validating the sampling process. (R. 10485.) 
As indicated above, we did test the 1993 sample performed by 
Washington Mutual and arrived at our own independent 
computations. (R. 10486.) 
Prudential would argue that this shows that the Master was only supposed to do 
sampling. There was no requirement that there be enough samples for the testing to be 
statistically significant.14 
14
 However, Prudential has never come forward with any factual evidence to show 
what size sample is needed to produce statistically significant results. For example, 
Prudential supposedly tested 400 records from a universe of 17,000 records. (R. 5385) 
The Master was not present and did not participate in the testing of the 400 records. 
Prudential has never offered evidence that testing of 400 from a universe of 17,000 is 
statistically significant. But worse still, the Master did not start again to do his own 
independent test of 400 different records. Rather, the Master tested 20 out of the 
Prudential's sample of 400 --Nwhich in reality means the Master independently tested 20 
files from a universe of 17,000 files. Prudential has never offered evidence to show that a 
sample of 20 from a universe of 17,000 can be statistically significant. 
(f lofjf.)
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POINT IX 
THIS CASE CAN COME TO A SPEEDY CONCLUSION 
A. THIS CASE WILL NEED TO BE REMANDED 
For all of the following reasons, this case should be remanded for further 
proceedings in the trial court: 
A. Damages should be computed for the years prior to 1971. 
(See Point II above.) 
B. Damages should be computed for the years after 1979. 
(See Point IV above.) 
C. The Master's work was not completed. (See Point VIII, ^ D above.) 
D. The Master should be replaced. (See Point VIII, f^ B above.) 
The trouble with all of the above is that this case is now thirty-two years old. 
Because of this specific problem, on October 28, 1996, Madsen filed a Motion that 
Master Perform an Auxiliary Computation of Damages . . . (R. 5035-7) (included herein 
as Ex. E.) The computation was to be at Madsen's expense. Of course, the purpose of 
the motion was so that if an appellate court allowed damages before 1971 (see Point II) or 
after 1979 (see Point IV) the appellate court could set damages without the time and 
expense of a new trial. That motion was not granted. (R. 5525.) 
Another trial, and perhaps another appeal, to resolve the above issues could take 
five to ten years. Such delay violates Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah 
which states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
39 
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; . . . 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD SPECIFY A SIMPLE METHOD TO CALCULATE 
DAMAGES 
But there is a shortcut. If the court adopts the reasoning of Derenco v Benjamin 
Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Assn , 281 Or. 533, 557 P.2d 427 (1978), the case 
could be resolved in the trial court in a matter of months. And, there would likely be no 
further appeal.15 
Derenco was a virtually identical case in Oregon. Derenco borrowed money from 
Benjamin Franklin to purchase a home. Benjamin Franklin required a monthly payment 
for annual taxes and insurance on the dwelling. As in the case at bar, Benjamin Franklin 
held the tax and insurance funds up to one year before payment was made on the taxes 
and insurance. Derenco claimed that Benjamin Franklin was earning a profit by using the 
tax and insurance funds (for up to one year) before the taxes and insurance bills were 
actually paid. Derenco filed a class action seeking an accounting and return of the profits. 
The Derenco court began its analysis by explaining the difficulty of computing 
actual profits on the funds: 
The trial judge looked at this complicated computation 
problem and resolved it with rough justice. He awarded income 
from the accounts to plaintiffs equal to the interest that was paid by 
Derenco was an interlocutory appeal. The Derenco court gave a specific 
formula on how the accounting should be computated. After the interlocutory appeal, the 
trial court was able to compute individual damages. But the damage formula in Derenco 
was so easy and so clean, that damages were processed in the trial court and there was no 
further appeal of the Final Judgment. (A later petition for certiorari was denied.) 
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defendant on ordinary pass book savings accounts. This is eminently 
sensible. The defendant is a mutual association. The total cost of all 
operations, including the maintenance of the reserve accounts as well 
as their investment, has necessarily been deducted from income 
before payment of pass book interest. The deposits in question were 
completely commingled with defendant's other invested funds. The 
cost of servicing the accounts and investing the funds were not 
capable of being isolated as separate components of defendant's total 
expenses. 
* * * 
Ordering an accounting on earnings from the deposits at pass book 
rates is a method of determining the extent of the profits as closely as 
possible. We conclude it is the appropriate measure of recovery in 
this case. Id., 577 P.2d at 494-5. (Emphasis added.) 
Listed below is Judge Rigtrup's computation of damages from 1971 to 1979. (See 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law included herein as Ex. D, R. 3006.) Note that, 
each year, the "Average Escrow Balance," and the "Average Expense Rate on Escrow 
Funds" is different from the preceding or following years. Note also that the "Net 
Earnings" are different for each of the years from 1971 to 1979. 
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However, in Point II of this brief, Madsen argues that damages should also be paid 
for the years 1964 to 1971. But in order to follow Judge Rigtrup's system, that would 
require the trial court judge (on remand) to hear evidence on the "Average Expense Rate" 
for each of the following years: 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. 
Likewise, the trial court would be required to hear evidence on "Average T-Bill yields" 
for each of the following years: 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. Also the 
trial court would hear similar evidence for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 
1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 . . . In other words, the trial court would be required to 
hold a "mini trial" on separate earnings each year for the duration of the trust deed 
contract. Of course, that process could take many months of trial time. But, all of that 
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can be changed if this Court follows Derenco. According to Derenco, the trial court 
could simply award the "ordinary passbook savings" rate for each year of the damage 
period. 
Indeed, the process is so simple and straight forward that a Master may not even be 
needed. If damages are computed by simply awarding the "ordinary passbook savings" 
rate, such computations might be done by clerical personnel, without the need of a fancy 
"Master." Indeed, most of the "Derenco type" of computations might be done by 
ordinary discovery procedures. Even if a Master is needed, it would obviously be much 
much easier to allow the (new) Master to simply compute the "passbook savings rate" on 
pledged funds. 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING 
This issue is one for the appellate court only, and hence is a question of law. 
Simper v Scorup, 78 Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941, 945 (1931). A trial in Simper was held three 
times. The Simper Court determined that the "litigation ought to end." So it gave 
specific instructions regarding damage calculations, ensuring it would end on remand. 
Since this issue does not involve a challenge to a factual or discretionary ruling by 
the trial court, there is no need to marshal evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Madsen contends that Prudential has failed for over 25 years to 
provide the accounting which was mandated in Madsen L Because Prudential has not 
come forward with its accounting, the trial court turned the accounting over to a Master. 
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However, Madsen contends that the Master has committed several errors, and that the 
work (or reports) of the Master must therefore be vacated. 
In summary, the core of this case is an accounting. However, at this stage (after 
three appeals and thirty years) neither Prudential nor the Master have provided a 
satisfactory accounting. Therefore, Madsen contends that this Court should remand the 
case with instructions to conduct the accounting using the "Derenco formula." 
However, if this Court remands the case, this Court should also instruct the trial 
court that: 
A. The work of the Master must be vacated; and if a Master is needed, a new 
Master should be appointed. 
B. There is no statute of limitations. 
C. Damages are not cut off in 1979 (because of § 7-17-4 Utah Code Ann.). 
D. Profits earned by Prudential on Madsen's trust fund should be compounded 
each year until such profits and interest are paid to Madsen. 
E. This Court should award pre-judgment interest. 
F. The trial court erred by removing duplexes, second homes, and commercial 
properties from the class. 
SPECIAL NOTE 
The following objection is provisional only. If the court decides that Madsen has 
correctly marshaled the evidence in this brief, the objection is withdrawn and there is no 
reason for the Court to rule on this objection. However, the Court should rule on this 
objection if this Court strikes or disregards some portions of this brief on the grounds ths 
the marshaling requirement has not been properly satisfied. 
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PROVISIONAL OBJECTION TO MARSHALING REQUIREMENT 
Appellant has attempted throughout this brief to satisfy the requirements of Rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to marshal the opponent's factual 
evidence. However, appellant respectfully submits such marshaling subject to the 
objection that the concept of marshaling violates Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution 
of Utah which states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay;.. . 
Simply stated, it can be a complicated and time consuming process for an attorney 
to uncover or research facts which might support the opponent (so-called "devil's 
advocate"). The expense for such extra research falls upon the client. Thus, a client must 
pay his own attorney to gather facts supporting the client; but the client must also pay his 
attorney extra money to gather facts that might oppose the client. (Even in contingent fee 
cases, the attorney may request a higher percentage if the attorney must take time to 
gather facts supporting the opponent's case, or the attorney in a contingent fee case might 
have less time to work on his own client's case after marshaling the opponent's 
evidence.) 
It is respectfully submitted that Anglo-Saxon law is an adversarial process. That 
means that Client A hires an attorney to tell Client A's side of the story. Then, Client B 
hires an attorney to tell Client B's side of the story. And the Court decides. It has never 
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been part of Anglo-Saxon law that a client must pay his attorney to tell both sides of the 
story. 
DATED this 7*7^ day of tftx^ck > 2007. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Robert J. DeBry 
A ^ . 
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able limits, as determined by the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Under the 
circumstances shown, and particularly in 
view of the answers given, we do not see 
that the cross-examination which was al-
lowed so transgressed propriety as to con-
stitute error prejudicial to the defendant. 
[3] In connection with the foregoing, 
the following should be observed: Prior to 
the colloquy above quoted from the record, 
but after the defendant had taken the 
stand and given his version of what had 
happened upon direct examination, his 
counsel moved the court to suppress any 
questions about his prior felony convictions 
on the ground that the records did not 
reflect that he voluntarily and under-
standingly entered his pleas of guilty in 
those cases. It was shown and defendant 
acknowledged that he was represented by 
counsel in those cases. Our view is in ac-
cord with that taken by the trial eourt: 
that in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary, we presume that the judgments 
of our courts are valid.8 This, in addition to 
the fact that the defendant himself made 
the choice to raise the issue before the jury, 
who on the basis of that and the whole 
evidence, did not believe that there was any 
reasonable doubt of his guilt, leads us to the 
"conclusion that there was no error and that 
he was accorded his entitlement of a fair 
trial.10 
[4,5] On the issue raised as to the fail-
ure to submit to the jury the lesser and 
included offense of simple assault, the fol-
lowing is pertinent: 
Defendants attorney stated to the court: 
Your Honor, it has been my advice to 
my client to move the Court to put in an 
instruction concerning the lesser, included 
offense of simple assault, and my* client 
does not wish to do that It would "be my 
9. State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426r 432 I .^2d 53; 
State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 
655. We so state in awareness of defendant's 
arguments, citing Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 
92 S.Ct 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374, and Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U,S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 
L.EdJ2d 274. 
recommendation to put one in, but he 
does not want to. [Emphasis added.] 
It is undoubtedly within the prerogative of 
the trial court to submit included offenses 
if he thinks that the interest of justice so 
require.11 But when the defendant indi-
cates that he does not want that done, the 
trial court is under no duty to disregard his 
request. If the defendant chooses as a mat-
ter of trial strategy to have his case sub-
mitted on the "all or nothing" gambit, when 
he loses, he should not be permitted to do 
an about face and claim that the trial court 
committed error in going along with his 
request, but should have submitted the in-
cluded offense anyway.12 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, MAU-
GHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
Richard MADSEN and Nancy A. Madsen, 
his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 14530. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 14, 1977. 
Trustors brought action against trustee 
and beneficiary under deed of trust to trus-
tors' home executed for purpose of securing 
promissory note, seeking restitution of prof-
its allegedly earned on money paid to de-
fendant pursuant to deed provision that 
10. State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 
196. 
11. State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618; 
State v. Valdez, footnote 8 above, State v. 
Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287. 
12. Ibid; and see State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 
149, 449 P.2d 993. 
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required plaintiffs to make monthly pay-
ments to defendant which could apply pay-
ments to insurance premiums and taxes or 
to sums due under deed or note. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. 
Croft, J., entered summary judgment for 
defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that fact 
issue whether payments were pledged prop-
erty existed, thus precluding summary 
judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Crockett, J., filed dissenting opinion in 
which Henriod, C. J., concurred. 
Judgment <s=>181(15) 
In action brought by trustors against 
trustee and beneficiary under deed of trust 
to trustor's home executed for purpose of 
securing promissory note, seeking restitu-
tion of profits allegedly earned on money 
paid to defendant pursuant to deed provi-
sion, which required plaintiffs to make 
monthly payments to defendant which 
could apply payments to insurance premi-
ums and taxes or to sums due under deed or 
note, which contained all essential elements 
of a pledge, and which granted security 
interest to defendant, fact issue whether 
such payments were pledged property exist-
ed, thus precluding summary judgment. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-207(2); U.C.C. § 9-207. 
Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs-appellants. 
Joseph J. Palmer, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant-respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
On appeal is a summary judgment grant-
ed to defendant, hereafter Prudential, 
against plaintiffs, hereafter Madsen or 
trustors. The action is founded upon terms 
of a deed of trust; and was brought to 
determine the status of the parties, and the 
legal consequences pursuant to such terms. 
We reverse the summary judgment, and 
remand for further proceedings. Costs are 
awarded to Madsen. Statutory references 
are to U.C.A.1953. 
Madsens are trustors, and defendant is 
both the trustee and beneficiary under a 
deed of trust executed September 21, 1964, 
for the purpose of securing a promissory 
note in the sum of $16,800. The security 
conveyed was the home in which plaintiffs 
reside. 
To protect the security, the trustors fur-
ther agreed: 
2. To keep the buildings and improve-
ments on the above described premises 
insured against loss by fire, and such 
other casualties and in such forms of in-
surance, and in such amounts, and in such 
companies as may be required by and as 
may be satisfactory to the beneficiary, 
for the benefit of the beneficiary, and to 
pay the premiums therefor promptly 
when due, and the policies of insurance 
shall be held by the beneficiary, it being 
understood, however, that the beneficiary 
shall in no event be responsible for the 
sufficiency or form or substance of any 
policy of insurance, or for the solvency or 
sufficiency of any insurance company in 
respect to the insurance herein provided. 
4. To pay before delinquent all taxes 
and assessments affecting said property 
(including assessments on appurtenant 
water stock and costs, interest and penal-
ties thereon); and all encumbrances, 
charges and liens, with interest and pen-
alties on said property or any part there-
of, which appear to be or are prior or 
superior hereto. 
In addition to the monthly payments as 
provided in said note, the trustor agrees 
to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same 
day each month, budget payments esti-
mated to equal one-twelfth of the annual 
taxes and insurance premiums; said 
budget payments to be adjusted from 
time to time as required, and said budget 
payments are hereby pledged to the bene-
ficiary as additional security for the full 
performance of this deed of trust and the 
note secured hereby. The budget pay-
ments so accumulated may be withdrawn 
by the beneficiary for the payment of 
taxes or insurance premiums due on the 
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premises. The beneficiary may at any 
time, without notice, apply said budget 
payments to the payment of any sums 
due under the terms of the deed of trust 
and the note secured hereby or either of 
them. Trustor's failure to pay said budg-
et payments shall constitute a default 
under this trust [Emphasis supplied.] 
Madsen *s appeal is predicated on the the-
ory that the monthly budget payments un-
der provision 4 of the instrument constitute 
a common law pledge. They alleged de-
fendant had invested this pledged property, 
and earned a substantial profit. An 
accounting is sought on the ground the 
substantial profits from the investment of 
the pledged funds constitute an unjust en-
richment, entitling them to restitution. 
The trial court ruled the funds accumu-
lated, from the monthly budget payments, 
were not pledged property. Therefore, the 
law of pledge was not applicable. 
In Campbell v. Peter1 this court stated: 
A pledge is really one of the simplest 
forms of security. It is the passing of 
possession of a chattel by the owner 
thereof to the pledgee who is thereby 
entitled to hold it until the debt is paid or 
the obligation performed. [Citations] 
We further cited with approval the defi-
nition in the Restatement Security, Sec. 1, 
p. 5, which provides: 
A pledge is a security interest in a 
chattel or an intangible represented by an 
indispensable instrument, the interest be-
ing created by a bailment for the purpose 
of securing the payment of a debt or the 
performance of some other duty. 
Comment d. of Sec. 1, p. 10 states: 
The term "chattel" means any physical 
object which is capable of manual deliv-
ery and which is not the subject-matter 
of real property. It includes instruments 
and documents. 
A deposit of money as security for the 
performance of a contract has been recog-
nized as a valid pledge.2 
it [is] of no consequence that 
the amount of f ilnds subjected to the lien, 
and thus, the amount of the lien, may 
vary during the existence of the pledge. 
The amount is ascertainable at any given 
time, and thus the lien is perfected as to 
amount.3 
In the current matter, plaintiffs, as the 
trustors, agreed to protect the security of 
Prudential by paying the insurance and 
taxes, Madsen agreed to pay the budget 
payments, and to pledge them to the bene-
ficiary "as additional security for the full 
performance" of the deed of trust and the 
note secured thereby. 
The essential elements of a pledge are 
contained in the agreement, viz., the exist-
ence of a debt or obligation, a transfer of 
property to the pledgee, to be held as secur-
ity and, if necessary, to be used to assure 
performance of the obligation. Further-
more, the payments accumulated, may, in 
the discretion of the beneficiary, be with-
drawn for the payment of taxes, insurance 
premiums due, or any sum due under the 
deed of trust, or note. There is no contract 
right granted to Madsen to compel defend-
ant to pay the insurance premiums or taxes. 
The payments accumulated may be retained 
as security or applied for the purposes stat-
ed. The primary obligation to pay the in-
surance, taxes, and any sum due under the 
deed of trust or note is Madsen's. The 
provisions of section 4 grant a security in-
terest to Prudential, for the purpose of se-
curing performance of trustors' obligations. 
Madsen cites Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch 
Company* to establish the legal conse-
quences, under a1 common law pledge, 
wherein profits accrue to pledgee; as a 
result of the possession of a pledged chattel. 
We there said it is the duty of a pledgee to 
collect the accruals, from the security, and 
1. 108 Utah 565, 568, 162 P.2d 754, 755 (1945) Jur.2d, Secured Transactions, Sec. 58, pp. 886-
887. 
2. Anderson v Pacific Bank, 112 Cal 598, 44 P. 
1063 (1896), United States v Hams, USDC 3- United st*tes v. Hams, note 2 supra. 
WD La 1966, 249 FSupp 221, 224, 68 Am 
4. 94 Utah 134, 143, 76 P.2d 234 (1938) 
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Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, his wife, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, for itself and all others similarly 
situated, Defendant-Appellee, 
Utah Bankers Association, Intervenor-Appellee. 
Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Honorable Aldon J. ANDERSON, Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division, Respondent. 
Nos. 79-1362, 79-1535. 
Argued May 6, 1980. 
Decided Dec. 3, 1980. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1981. 
Savings and loan association brought suit for 
declaratory relief, asserting that it was not required 
to pay interest or account to borrowers on escrowed 
funds. The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division, Aldon J. 
Anderson, J., consolidated suit with class action for 
an accounting and recovery of profits earned by 
lender on escrowed amounts which action had been 
brought by borrowers in state court and removed by 
lender, and granted summary judgment in favor of 
lender. Borrowers appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Seymour, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) since no 
federal controversy was disclosed on face of 
borrowers' state court complaint, as amended, 
removal was improper, and (2) federal court had no 
subject-matter jurisdiction over declaratory 
judgment action. 
Reversed with directions. 
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Because borrowers predicated their suit to recover 
interest realized from lender's use of escrow fund 
upon rights created under state law, fact that federal 
regulations may have created defense to recovery 
on such claim was immaterial to finding of federal 
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337, 
1441(b). 
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Even if federal law has preempted state law in area 
of federal savings and loan regulation, lender's 
claim of federal preemption raised to defeat 
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question jurisdiction on removal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1331, 1337, 1441(b). 
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334 Removal of Cases 
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334kl9 Cases Arising Under Laws of United 
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334k 19(1) k. In General Most Cited Cases 
Given absence of significant conflict between state 
contract law and federal policy expressed in 
regulation providing that "except as provided by 
contract, a federal association shall have no 
obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts apart 
from the duties imposed by this paragraph," state 
law was applicable in determining whether lender 
contracted to pay interest on borrower's escrow 
account, and thus claim did not arise under laws of 
United States, as would support removal 
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337, 1441(b). 
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Federal district court had no jurisdiction over 
lender's action for declaratory relief, asserting that it 
was not required to pay interest or account to 
borrowers for profits realized on escrowed funds, 
since controversy underlying action was one of state 
law as to whether lender was obligated by its 
contract with borrowers to pay interest on escrowed 
funds, and lender's claim was defensive in nature. 
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337, 1441(b). 
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Acting Associate Gtn. Counsel, Michael L. Seablot, 
Trial Atty., of Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
Washington, D. C, on the brief for amicus curiae 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
Before LOGAN, PECK [FN*] and SEYMOUR, 
Circuit Judges. 
FN* Of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit sitting by designation. 
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 
The Madsens, plaintiffs-appellants, borrowed 
money from Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association (Prudential) to' purchase a home in 
1964. Pursuant to this loan, the Madsens signed a 
trust deed [FN1] requiring them to make "budget 
payments" of one-twelfth of the annual estimated 
taxes and insurance along with their monthly 
payments of principal and interest. Under the 
agreement, these budget payments were pledged as 
additional security for repayment of the loan. The 
funds were accumulated in a reserve account and 
used annually for the payment of taxes and 
insurance. 
FN1. The trust deed provides in pertinent 
part: 
"In addition to the monthly payments as 
provided in said note, the TRUSTOR 
agrees to pay to the BENEFICIARY, upon 
the same day each month, budget payments 
estimated to equal one-twelfth of the 
annual taxes and insurance premiums; said 
budget payments to be adjusted from time 
to time as required, and said budget 
payments are hereby pledged to the 
BENEFICIARY as additional security for 
the full performance of this deed of trust 
and the note secured hereby. The budget 
payments so accumulated may be 
withdrawn by the BENEFICIARY for the 
payment of taxes or insurance premiums 
due on the premises. The BENEFICIARY 
may at any time, without notice, apply said 
budget payments to the payment of sums 
due under the terms of this deed of trust 
and the note secured hereby or either of 
them. TRUSTOR'S failure to pay said 
budget payments shall constitute a default 
under this trust." 
App., vol. I, at 5. 
On March 3, 1975, the Madsens [FN2] filed a class 
action [FN3] in Utah state court seeking to recover 
interest realized from Prudential's use of the 
escrowed funds, based on claims of breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment. The state trial court 
granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment. 
In January 1977, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the summary judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings. It held that the trust deed contained the 
essential elements of a pledge, and that under Utah 
common law a pledgee must account to the pledgor 
for profits resulting from the use of the pledged 
property. In October 1977, the Madsens amended 
their complaint to ask for an accounting and 
recovery of the profits earned by Prudential on the 
escrowed amounts. This amended complaint added 
a defendant class of lenders with similar escrow 
FN2. The original complaint named 
Richard Madsen only as plaintiff. An 
amended complaint was filed April 10, 
1975, joining his wife Nancy. 
FN3. Numerous issues regarding the 
classes named in these proceedings have 
been raised on appeal. They are not 
relevant to our disposition of this case and 
are not addressed in our opinion. 
Meanwhile in April 1977, Prudential filed a 
separate action for declaratory relief in federal 
court, asserting thatunder 12 C.F.R. s 545.6-11(c) 
[FN4] (hereinafter referred *800 to as section 
545.6-11(c)), it is not required to pay interest or 
account to the Madsens on the escrowed funds. The 
complaint based jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. s 1337 
[FN5] and sought a declaration of the rights and 
obligations of the parties to the trust deed. When the 
Madsens amended their state complaint, Prudential 
promptly filed a removal petition, alleging that the 
relief requested arises under and is controlled by 
federal law. The Utah Bankers Association, a trade 
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association of commercial banks domiciled in Utah, 
intervened in the action, and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board filed an amicus curiae brief. The 
federal court denied the Madsens' motion to remand 
the case, consolidated the removed action and the 
declaratory judgment suit, and granted summary 
judgment in favor of Prudential. 
FN4. 12 C.F.R. s 545.6-11(c) provides: 
"A Federal association which makes a loan 
on or after June 16, 1975, on the security 
of a single-family dwelling occupied or to 
be occupied by the borrower (except such 
a loan for which a bona fide commitment 
was made before that date) shall pay 
interest on any escrow account maintained 
in connection with such a loan (1) if there 
is in effect a specific statutory provision or 
provisions of the State in which such 
dwelling is located by or under which the 
State-chartered savings and loan 
associations, mutual savings banks and 
similar institutions are generally required 
to pay interest on such escrow accounts, 
and (2) at not less than the rate required to 
be paid by such State-chartered institutions 
but not to exceed the rate being paid by the 
Federal association on its regular accounts 
(as defined by Section 526.1 of this 
chapter). Except as provided by contract, a 
Federal association shall have no 
obligation to pay interest on escrow 
accounts apart from the duties imposed by 
this paragraph." (Emphasis added). 
FN5. 28 U.S.C. s 1337 provides: 
"The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action or 
proceeding arising under any Act of 
Congress regulating commerce or 
protecting trade and commerce 
restraints and monopolies." 
against 
On appeal, the Madsens contend, inter alia, that the 
federal court lacks jurisdiction over either the 
removed case or the declaratory judgment action. 
We agree, and reverse with directions to remand the 
removed action to state court and to dismiss the 
declaratory action. 
Removal Jurisdiction 
Prudential sought removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 
1441(b), which provides in pertinent part: 
"Any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right 
arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of 
the United States shall be removable without regard 
to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 
Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. s 1331 
[FN6] and section 1337 because the cause of action 
allegedly arose under the laws of the United States 
and Acts of Congress regulating commerce. 
FN6. 28 U.S.C. s 1331(a) provides in 
pertinent part: 
"The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs, and arises under the Constitution, 
laws or treaties of the United States." 
We note that the same standards apply to 
whether the issue "arises under" federal 
law in both this section and section 1337. 
The Madsens contend their claim in state court is 
founded upon contract rights and obligations 
created by state law. They assert that Prudential 
retains the Madsens' budget payments for up to a 
year before using the funds to pay the taxes and 
insurance, that Prudential invests the funds in the 
interim and receives a profit, and that the Madsens 
are entitled to be paid the profits earned on the 
pledged funds. The Madsens point out that no 
federal law or regulation was invoked, relied on, 
attacked, or cited in their complaint. Consequently, 
they say, their claim did not arise under federal law. 
Prudential and Intervenor argue, on the other hand, 
that the trust agreement between Prudential and the 
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Madsens contains no express language requiring the 
payment of interest on the escrowed funds, and that 
the federal regulation does not contemplate interest 
payments under such circumstances. They say that 
interpretation of the agreement arises under federal 
law because Prudential is a regulated federal 
savings and loan association and Congress has 
preempted the area. 
[1] The conditions under which a suit may be said 
to "arise under" the laws of the United States were 
definitively set out in Gully v. First National Bank, 
299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). 
There the Court stated that the required federal right 
or immunity must be an essential element of the 
plaintiffs cause of action, and that the federal 
controversy must be "disclosed upon the face of the 
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition 
for removal." Id. at 113, 57 S.Ct. at 98. It is beyond 
argument that a defense predicated upon *801 
federal law is not enough by itself to confer federal 
jurisdiction, even though the defense is certain to 
arise. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 366 U.S. 656, 663, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 1307, 6 
L.Ed.2d 584 (1961); Seneca Nursing Home v. 
Kansas State Board of Social Welfare, 490 F.2d 
1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 
841, 95 S.Ct. 72, 42 L.Ed.2d 69 (1974); Warner 
Bros. Records, Inc. v. R. A. Ridges Distributing 
Co., 475 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1973). 
In Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 
1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 
952, 99 S.Ct. 2182, 60 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1979), we 
described the test for determining whether a 
complaint asserts, on its face, a substantial federal 
question: 
"A case 'arises' under the laws of the United States 
if it clearly and substantially involves a dispute or 
controversy respecting the validity, construction or 
effect of such laws which is determinative of the 
resulting judgment. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 
561, 32 S.Ct. 704, 56 L.Ed. 1205 (1912). Thus, if 
the action is not expressly authorized by federal 
law, does not require the construction of a federal 
statute and/or regulation and is not required by 
some distinctive policy of a federal statute to be 
determined by application of federal legal 
principles, it does not arise under the laws of the 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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United States for federal question jurisdiction. 
Lindy v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 1367 (3rd Cir. 1974)." 
No argument has been made on appeal that the 
Madsens' claim is expressly authorized by federal 
law. Consequently, federal removal jurisdiction is 
established in this case only if the Madsens' claim 
requires the construction of a federal regulation or 
the application of federal law. 
The federal trial court based its finding of 
jurisdiction on North Davis Bank v. First National 
Bank, 457 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1972). We find that 
case distinguishable. There the central issue in the 
complaint was whether the defendant's facility 
constituted a branch of a national bank. We noted 
that the Supreme Court in First National Bank v. 
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133, 90 S.Ct. 337, 343, 
24 L.Ed.2d 312 (1969), held this determination to 
be a "threshold question of federal law." 457 F.2d 
at 822. Therefore we held: "(t)his is not a case in 
which a federal statute is indirectly or collaterally 
involved but it is one having its source in and 
arising under (the McFadden Act) 12 U.S.C. s 36(f). 
"Id. at 823. 
[2] Here the basic issue in the Madsens' complaint 
is whether the contract between the Madsens and 
Prudential requires the payment of profits or interest 
on escrowed funds. Although construction of the 
federal regulation cited by Prudential may be 
relevant to the defense Prudential asserts, i. e., that 
section 545.6-11(c) does not require payment of 
interest, the meaning of the regulation is absolutely 
irrelevant to the Madsens1 theory of recovery. 
Because the Madsens have predicated their suit 
upon rights created under state law, the fact that 
federal regulations may create a defense to recovery 
on such a claim is immaterial to a finding of federal 
question jurisdiction. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Texaco, 415 U.S. 125, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 39 L.Ed.2d 
209 (1974); Pan American Petroleum, 366 U.S. at 
662-64,81 S.Ct. at 1307-1308. 
[3] Prudential and Intervenor contend that removal 
jurisdiction exists because federal law has 
preempted state law in the area of federal savings 
and loan regulation. The amicus curiae brief 
supports the argument that the field of regulatory 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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control over federal associations has been 
preempted. However, even if federal preemption 
were established, it would not confer jurisdiction 
when it is raised by the defendant to defeat a 
common-law contract claim brought in state court. 
See Pan American Petroleum, 366 U.S. at 662-65, 
81 S.Ct. at 1307-1309; Washington v. American 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 
654, 660 (9th Cir. 1972), and cases cited therein. In 
Home Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Insurance Department, 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978) 
, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction despite a federal preemption 
argument: 
*802 "(T)he Commissioner's proceeding against 
Home Federal was based solely upon alleged 
violations of Iowa's insurance law and raised no 
federal question. Home Federal's allegations of 
preemption and failure to engage in the 'business of 
insurance,' asserted in its federal petition, actually 
are in the nature of defenses to the Commissioner's 
charges. Hence they will not suffice for federal 
question jurisdiction here. The case is basically 
simply an alleged violation of state law. It is not a 
federal case and is not converted to one by Home 
Federal's defenses to the state's basic allegations." 
Id. at 427. Prudential's claim of federal preemption 
is in the nature of a defense to the Madsens' cause 
of action and cannot be the basis of federal question 
jurisdiction on removal. 
It is also argued that the Madsens' claim arises 
under the laws of the United States because the 
contract must be interpreted under federal common 
law rather than state law. This is so, Prudential 
urges, because the regulation addressing the 
payment of interest by federal savings and loan 
associations, section 545.6-11(c), states that " 
(e)xcept as provided by contract, a Federal 
Association shall have no obligation to pay interest 
on escrow accounts apart from the duties imposed 
by this paragraph." (Emphasis added). Prudential 
contends that the circumstances constituting a " 
contract" within the meaning of the federal 
regulation is a federal question. 
[4][5] It is true that the application of federal 
common law to a plaintiffs cause of action is 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction and thus 
support removal. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91, 100, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 1391, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 
(1972). However, federal common law is not 
automatically applied to resolve all disputes in a 
field subject to pervasive federal regulation. "In 
deciding whether rules of federal common law 
should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle 
is that a significant conflict between some federal 
policy or interest and the use of state law in the 
premises must first be specifically shown." Wallis 
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 
86 S.Ct. 1301, 1304, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966). Here, 
it is vigorously argued that application of state law 
would create a significant conflict because federal 
policy requires uniform nationwide standards for 
the handling of escrow accounts by federal savings 
and loan associations. This argument founders on 
the very language of the regulation cited to support 
it. Section 545.6-11(c) provides that a federal 
savings and loan association shall pay interest on 
escrow accounts if a state statute requires such 
payments to be made by state-chartered institutions, 
or if payments are required by contract. The 
regulation expressly anticipates that the obligation 
of a federal institution to pay interest on escrow 
accounts not only will vary from state to state, but 
from contract to contract. See Johnson v. First 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, 418 F.Supp. 
1106, 1109 (E.D.Mich. 1976). Any argument that 
federal policy requires nationwide uniformity with 
regard to this issue is untenable. [FN7] See United 
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 86 S.Ct. 500, 15 
L.Ed.2d 404 (1966). 
FN7. We note Intervenor's argument that 
this case arises under federal law because 
the mortgage form must be approved by 
the regulatory agency, see 24 C.F.R. s 
203.17, and because the mortgage must 
provide for monthly escrow payments for 
taxes and insurance, see 24 C.F.R. s 
203.23(a). However, these regulations are 
silent on the issue of interest payments on 
escrow accounts, and therefore do not 
conflict with section 545.6-11(c), which 
allows interest to be required or prohibited 
by the individual contract terms. 
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Accordingly, we reject the argument that 
the use of these forms mandates a uniform 
interpretation under federal law. 
[6][7][8] Contractual obligations are created by 
state law. See Gully, 299 U.S. at 114-15, 57 S.Ct. at 
98-99. See also Pan American Petroleum v. 
Superior Court, 366 U.S. at 662-663, 81 S.Ct. at 
1307-1308. "The interpretation and enforcement of 
contracts is (sic ) traditionally within the province 
of state courts," Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 
F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1975), and the general 
presumption is in favor of applying state law. Note: 
Federal Common Law, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1512 (1969) 
Given *803 the absence of a significant conflict 
between the federal policy expressed in section 
545.6-11(c) and the use of state law, we hold that 
state law is applicable in determining whether 
Prudential contracted to pay interest on the 
Madsens1 escrow account. 
Since no federal controversy was disclosed on the 
face of the Madsens' state court complaint, as 
amended, removal was improper and the 
consolidated case must be remanded to state court. 
II. 
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction 
[9] The question remains whether the federal court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over Prudential's 
declaratory judgment action. The federal complaint 
alleges that Prudential is a federal savings and loan 
association regulated by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, that it makes residential real estate 
loans insured and guaranteed by federal agencies, 
and that it is not permitted to pay interest or to 
otherwise account for profits realized on escrowed 
funds paid by mortgagors "except as provided by 
applicable federal regulations." App., vol. II, at 
180. It points out that the Madsens have filed a 
class action in state court seeking interest on the 
escrowed funds under the contractual arrangements 
between Prudential and its borrowers, that "(a) 
proper resolution of said controversy requires a 
declaration of the respective rights and obligations 
of the parties to said contractual arrangements," id. 
at 181, and that this determination presents a 
question under federal laws regulating commerce or 
under federal common law.[FN8] 
FN8. We have already concluded in part I, 
supra, that federal common law is not 
applicable to interpret the contract between 
Prudential and the Madsens. 
As we have noted, the federal regulation that 
Prudential cites in its complaint provides that 
interest shall be paid on escrow accounts if a statute 
in the state where the mortgaged property is located 
requires similar lending institutions to pay such 
interest. 12 C.F.R. 545.6-11(c), supra n. 4. The 
regulation also provides that a federal association 
has no other obligation to pay such interest " 
(e)xcept as provided by contract." Id. Consequently, 
the controversy underlying the federal declaratory 
judgment action is the same as in state court: 
whether Prudential is obligated by its contract with 
the Madsens to pay interest on the escrowed funds. 
This court has consistently adopted the rationale set 
out by the Supreme Court in Public Service 
Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 
248, 73 S.Ct. 236, 242-243, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952): 
"Where the complaint in an action for declaratory 
judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an 
impending or threatened state court action, it is the 
character of the threatened action, and not of the 
defense, which will determine whether there is 
federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court. If 
the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant 
threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim 
under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court 
may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment 
establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious 
even though the declaratory complaint sets forth a 
claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the 
nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action. 
Federal courts will not seize litigations from state 
courts merely because one, normally a defendant, 
goes to federal court to begin his federal-law 
defense before the state court begins the case under 
state law. (citations omitted)." 
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(Emphasis added). In Monks v. Hetherington, 573 
R2d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 1978), we applied the 
traditional view "that a party cannot by artful 
pleading anticipate a defense based on federal law 
and thus bring within federal jurisdiction an action 
that could not otherwise be heard in federal court." 
And in Chandler v. O'Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045, 
1055-56 (10th Cir. 1971), we noted that this 
principle is particularly applicable where, as here, 
the state court action *804 has been instituted and 
issues have been decided. 
We held in part I, supra, that the federal preemption 
argument is defensive in nature. This is true whether 
the claim is made as the basis of removal or to 
support federal jurisdiction in a declaratory 
judgment action. See, e. g., Home Federal Savings 
& Loan Association v. Insurance Department, 571 
F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978). This case is not like 
Conference of Federal Savings & Loan 
Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 3256 (9th Cir. 1979) 
, affd mem., 445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 63 
L.Ed.2d 754 (1980), First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 
1979), or others cited by Prudential, Intervenor, and 
amicus curiae, where state regulations directly 
conflict with federal regulations governing federal 
associations. No such conflict exists here. 
(1971). 
Here as in Gully "(t)he most one can say is that a 
question of federal law is lurking in the background. 
" 299 U.S. at 117, 57 S.Ct. at 99-100. Accordingly, 
we hold the court has no jurisdiction over the 
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The defensive nature of Prudential's claim is 
expressed throughout its complaint. It alleges that a 
state action has been brought seeking interest 
pursuant to the contractual arrangements between 
the parties, and that any order of the state court 
requiring Prudential to pay interest or otherwise 
account to the Madsens would be contrary to the 
federal regulations. If the Madsens had attempted to 
bring their action in federal court by anticipating or 
responding to Prudential's possible federal defense, 
the case would lack federal jurisdiction. See Phillips 
Petroleum, 415 U.S. at 128, 94 S.Ct. at 1004; 
Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. 667, at 672, 70 S.Ct. 876, 
879, 94 L.Ed. 1194; Home Federal Savings & Loan 
Association, 571 F.2d at 426-27. It is irrelevant for 
purposes of jurisdiction that "federal consent is the 
source of state authority." Gully, 299 U.S. at 116, 
57 S.Ct. at 99; Oklahoma ex rel. Wilson v. 
Blankenship, 447 F.2d 687, 691 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 942, 30 L.Ed.2d 787 
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Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, his wife, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 860148. 
Dec. 30, 1988. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Philip 
R. Fishier, J., entered an order which disqualified 
another judge after he had presided over a trial and 
had orally announced his ruling but before he had 
entered formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and final judgment. Opponents of disqualification 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) the motion to disqualify the judge was not 
timely; (2) the judge's remarks did not evidence 
prejudice so as to justify disqualification; and (3) 
the judge did not have a financial interest in the 
outcome of the case. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred in the result. 
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STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Richard and Nancy Madsen appeal a 
district court order entered by Judge Philip Fishier 
which disqualified Judge Kenneth Rigtrup after he 
had presided over a trial in this case and had orally 
announced his ruling but before he had entered 
formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
final judgment. Judge Fishier ruled that Judge 
Rigtrup had no actual bias, but did have an 
appearance of bias and voided the trial and all prior 
orders entered by Judge Rigtrup in the case. 
This appeal is yet another installment in the 
protracted history of this case, which started in 
1975 and has already been before this Court once, 
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 558 
P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977), and before a federal 
appellate court once, Madsen v. Prudential Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.1980), 
cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 3007, 69 
L.Ed.2d 389 (1981). The facts which gave rise to 
this litigation are reported in detail in those 
opinions. 558 P.2d at 1338-39; 635 F.2d at 
799-800. 
Plaintiffs are representatives of a certified class of 
borrowers whose trust deeds with Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereafter " 
Prudential") contained language identical to that 
contained in the Madsens' trust deed. In 1984, this 
action was assigned to Third District Court Judge 
Kenneth Rigtrup who had been assigned to four 
other similar cases.FN1 Prudential appeared as 
amicus curiae in each of the other actions. 
FN1. Roger Hal Read and Elizabeth W. 
Read, for themselves and all others 
similarly situated v. American Equity 
Corporation, for itself and all others 
similarly situated, district court No. 
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C-244219 (filed August 11, 1977). James 
W. Petty and Mary E Petty, for themselves 
and all others similarly situated v. Western 
Savings and Loan Co., district court No. 
C-79-700 (dismissed July 19, 1983). 
Russell R Everill and Helen B. Everill, for 
themselves and all others similarly situated 
v Western Savings and Loan Co., district 
court No. C-79-701 (dismissed July 19, 
1983). Ernest H. Dixon and Lori Ann P. 
Dixon, for themselves and all others 
similarly situated v United Savings and 
Loan Ass'n, district court No. C-79-1105 
(filed February 16, 1979). 
The issue here was whether a financial institution 
which loaned money to the plaintiffs on a first trust 
deed is obligated to pay interest to the plaintiffs on 
monthly budget payments for property taxes and 
insurance that are paid with the monthly mortgage 
payments. In a bench trial in September 1985, the 
Madsens and Prudential tried the limited issue of 
whether Prudential made any profit on the budget 
payments it collected from the Madsens. At the 
close of the trial, Judge Rigtrup ruled from the 
bench. Just prior to his ruling, the following 
exchange occurred between Judge Rigtrup and 
counsel for the parties: 
THE COURT: ... I'll share the benefits of my 
decision with you at this point. 
... I'll expose my biases and my prejudices and be 
very frank with you. 
I think there are some substantial kinds of policy 
things that have really caused me great trouble and 
trauma. As I've indicated earlier, and no objection 
was interposed, I was a customer of Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association and paid 
without default for 25 years at four and 
three-quarters per cent, ... and I computed that out 
and I thought, why, those robbers, they are charging 
me twice what I'm borrowing from them, and that's 
unfair. 
As I get older and more sophisticated I-
MR. PALMER [Attorney for Prudential]: Your 
Honor, I hate to interrupt, but I need to make the 
point that this is news to me, that you had been a 
customer of Prudential. 
THE COURT: I indicated that on several occasions. 
MR. PALMER: I beg the Court's pardon, but that is 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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news to me. I don't *540 recall that at all-if 
anybody else does-recall you telling me that, and I-
THE COURT: I indicated that in these earlier 
meetings that I had paid my loan off at some point, 
and I'd had a loan with Prudential Federal Savings. 
MR. PALMER: Perhaps the Court is thinking of 
conferences with other counsel. The reason I make 
the point is-
THE COURT: My earlier conferences were not 
with the two of you in this case, they were with Mr. 
Billings, with Mr. Ashton, with you, with Mr. 
Giauque, Mr. McDonough, with respect to whoever 
he represents. It was Mr. Giauque or someone 
from that office. They were a corrective kind of a 
deal. 
MR. PALMER: In any event, I stand to raise the 
point now that it is news to us. I believe it-I take it 
that the Court did not feel that it had any prejudice 
because of that. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. PALMER: All right. 
THE COURT: I have a recollection that 
somewhere along the line I did make that 
disclosure. I don't know how you could be part of 
the community and be a homeowner and not have 
borrowed from someone. And so I think I make it 
very clear in one of those collective kinds of 
meetings that my loan had been with Prudential 
Federal. 
At any rate, it's a fact, and it was something that I 
never tried to hide or have hid from anyone. So 
there's no sense of covering up. I guess if that 
creates error, it creates error. But so be it. I have 
a recollection that I did expose it, and whether you 
were there or Mr. Lewis or anyone else, I don't 
know. I did make the disclosure early on. 
MR. DeBRY [Attorney for the Madsens]: I do 
recall some conversations, I think, off the record, of 
that effect, and I honestly don't recall who was 
present. But it was a comment that was made from 
time to time. 
MR. PALMER: Could I inquire of the Court when 
the loan was paid off? 
THE COURT: Probably two years ago. I'm not 
sure at what point in the discussions I indicated that, 
but I'm sure that in the presence of the collective 
group that I indicated that I had been a borrower of 
Prudential Federal Savings. 
MR. PALMER: No prejudice arose in the Court's 
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mind because of the fact that we collected a 
mortgage escrow from you? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. PALMER: Okay. I can't do anything else but 
ask. 
THE COURT: That's what I've been trying to tell 
you. That was the intention. 
MR. PALMER: I make the point because I didn't 
want to go on and let the Court note-
THE COURT: I think I've made general comments 
throughout that I have cussed financial institutions, 
and customers do simply because they see inherent 
injustice about that. And my perspective today, 
after 23 years has passed, has become much, much 
different at the end of the 23 years. Far before that 
I could see the cost of money was markedly greater, 
and that I would be a damn fool to prepay. So I 
paid faithfully every month for 25 years, and not a 
day sooner or a day later. And I'm just 
commenting generally in terms of unjust or 
whatever. The tension is between that to be gained 
and that to be lost, I suppose, in my eyes. And I 
have a feeling that class actions are a form of 
champerty and maintenance in that the one that 
substantially gains is the lawyer or the expert. Mr. 
Madsen stands to gain little, except he has struck a 
blow for freedom, I suppose, in the form that the 
consumer has achieved balance. 
Be seated, Mr. DeBry. 
MR. DeBRY: 1 want to make an objection on the 
record. I really must. 
THE COURT: Well, sit down. 
MR. DeBRY: Before you give your decision, I 
must make a comment, because I know the Court is 
being candid and this has been a long struggle, and 
Prudential says they are almost broke before this. 
And you say maybe DeBry will make some money, 
but I haven't yet. But I really must interpose an 
objection at this *541 point. If the Court harbors 
this type of personal bias with respect to-
THE COURT: I'm just-
MR. DeBRY: -class actions. 
THE COURT: I'm just telling you about the tension. 
MR. DeBRY: I must object to the Court's sitting on 
this case if you have that kind of bias. 
THE COURT: I'm just telling you why I'm getting 
to my ruling and how I'm getting to my ruling and 
being open and candid with both of you. But that's 
a built-in problem with class actions. They have 
achieved a beneficial result. The difficulty] I am 
locked into is that I have got to follow the law of the 
case. I have got the Supreme Court that's telling 
me what to do.... 
MR. DeBRY: Your Honor-
THE COURT: You can take exceptions after I get 
done. I'm trying to-
MR. DeBRY: I might note that I do have an 
exception to take at this time before you give your 
verdict in this matter. 
THE COURT: I haven't given a verdict. 
Prudential did not object during the course of the 
exchange. Judge Rigtrup rendered his decision in 
favor of the Madsens and awarded them damages of 
$134.70. 
After the ruling, Judge Rigtrup asked if either side 
wished to take any exceptions. Prudential's 
attorney stated only that an appeal was anticipated 
before any class issues were addressed. However, 
no specific objection to Judge Rigtrup's 
qualifications was voiced. 
Thirty-nine days after Judge Rigtrup announced his 
decision, Prudential raised its first formal objection 
to the judge's qualifications to hear the case by 
filing a motion for disqualification under Rule 63(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.FN2 The 
motion was assigned to the then-presiding judge of 
the Third District, the Honorable Philip Fishier. 
Judge Fishier held several hearings on the motion 
and considered testimony, portions of the trial 
transcript, affidavits, and memoranda in reaching 
his decision. Judge Fishier ruled that Prudential's 
motion was timely, that the possibility existed that 
Judge Rigtrup may have a financial interest in the 
outcome of the case, and that Judge Rigtrup's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Judge 
Fishier expressly found no actual bias on the part of 
Judge Rigtrup, but ordered him disqualified solely 
on the appearance of bias. After the case was 
assigned to another judge for retrial, we granted 
plaintiffs' request for an interlocutory appeal of 
Judge Fishler's order. 
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FN2. Rule 63(b) reads: 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to 
any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, 
or his attorney shall make and file an 
affidavit that the judge before whom such 
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any 
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall 
proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the 
matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts 
and the reasons for the belief that such bias 
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as 
soon as practicable after the case has been 
assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed questions the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter 
an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another judge 
(naming him) of the same court or of a 
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall 
then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed does not question the 
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the 
judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient, another 
judge must be called in to try the case or 
determine the matter in question. No 
party shall be entitled in any case to file 
more than one affidavit; and no such 
affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied 
by a certificate of counsel of record that 
such affidavit and application are made in 
good faith. 
I. 
The Madsens contend that Prudential waived its 
objections to Judge Rigtrup's qualifications by 
failing to make a timely objection at the time of the 
judge's exchange with counsel, thereby giving 
Prudential the advantage of waiting to see if the 
ruling was favorable and, if not, of moving to 
disqualify. In addition, Prudential*542 waited an 
extended period to file its motion to disqualify. 
[1] While a motion to disqualify a judge should not 
be undertaken lightly, it must be made promptly. A 
party who has a reasonable basis for moving to 
disqualify a judge may not delay in the hope of first 
obtaining a favorable ruling and then complain only 
if the result is unfavorable. Not only is such a 
tactic unfair, but it may evidence a belief that the 
judge is not in fact biased. Furthermore, delay 
imposes unnecessary disruption on both the judicial 
system and litigants. A disqualification proceeding 
is a collateral attack on the substantive action, it 
disrupts orderly litigation, and it necessarily results 
in significant additional costs to the parties. 
Accordingly, a party must move with dispatch once 
a basis for disqualification is discovered. See 
Duplan Corp v. Deenng Milhken, Inc., 400 
F.Supp. 497, 508-10 (D.S.C.1975); Hunmcutt v 
Hunnicutt, 248 Ga. 516, 518, 283 S.E.2d 891, 893 
(1981). See generally L. Abramson, Judicial 
Disqualification Under Canon 3C of the Code oj 
Judicial Conduct 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter L. 
Abramson, Judicial Disqualification ]. 
Timeliness is essential in filing a motion to 
disqualify.FN3 In Utah, disqualification motions in 
civil proceedings are governed by Rule 63(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set out in footnote 
2). That rule requires that a disqualification motion 
"shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case 
has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known." The issue in this case is whether 
Prudential's failure to raise the issue during the 
colloquy with the judge before the ruling, its failure 
to object after the oral ruling was made when 
objections were invited by Judge Rigtrup, and 
Prudential's delay of thirty-nine days after the trial 
to file its disqualification motion meet the "as soon 
as practicable" requirement of Rule 63(b). 
FN3. Some jurisdictions impose specific 
time limitations on some disqualification 
motions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982) 
(affidavit of bias must be filed not less 
than ten days before the beginning of the 
term at which the proceeding is to be 
heard); Alaska Stat. § 22.20.022(c) (1984) 
(affidavit for peremptory removal of judge 
must be filed within 5 days after the case is 
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at issue or within 5 days after the issue is 
assigned to a judge); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. 
title 14, § 1103 (1980 & Supp.1988) 
(petition for change of judge must be filed 
within ten days after service of complaint 
or other application for which equitable 
relief is sought); Minn.R.Civ.P. 63.03 
(notice to remove judge must be filed 
within ten days after a party receives 
notice of which judge is presiding at the 
trial or hearing, but no later than 
commencement of the trial or hearing). 
Federal cases require that motions to disqualify 
must be made as soon as the facts which form the 
basis for the disqualification become known. See 
United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th 
Cir.1986) ("a motion for recusal filed weeks after 
the conclusion of a trial is presumptively untimely 
absent a showing of good cause for its tardiness"); 
Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 60S (10th 
Cir.1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 
1396, 84 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985) (motion to disqualify 
filed one year after complaint and after adverse 
rulings of trial court was untimely); Wood v. 
McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir.1981), cert, 
denied, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1437 (1982) (delay 
of sixteen months after grounds for disqualification 
arose made motion to disqualify untimely); United 
States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir.1976), 
cert denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51 
L.Ed.2d 775 (1977) ("The ] a w is well settled that 
one must raise the disqualification of the judge at 
the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts 
demonstrating the basis for such disqualification."); 
Satterfield v. Edenton-Chowan Bd. of Educ, 530 
F.2d 567, 574 (4th Cir.1975) ("One must raise the 
disqualification of the trier, whether he be a judge, 
an administrator, or an arbitrator, at the earliest 
moment after knowledge of the facts."); Davis v. 
Cities Sei-v. Oil Co., 420 F.2d 1278, 1282 (10th 
Cir.1970) (motion to disqualify filed a month after 
the case was decided against movants is too late); 
Duplan Corp. v, Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 
F.Supp. 497, 510 (D.S.C.1975) ("a recusal motion 
must be made at counsel's first opportunity after 
discovery of the disqualifying facts" (emphasis in 
original)). 
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timeliness requirements. See, eg., Wakefield v. 
Stevens, 249 Ga. 254, 255, 290 S.E.2d 58, 60 (1982) 
(motion to disqualify untimely if not "filed 
promptly and without delay, at the first opportunity 
after ... [learning] of the grounds for disqualification 
" (quoXmgStale v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700, 705, 267 
S.E.2d 207, 210 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring))); 
Carpenter v. State, 223 Kan. 523, 525, 575 P.2d 26, 
29 (1978) (affidavit of prejudice should be filed as 
soon as a party "becomes aware of the facts giving 
rise to the challenge"). The rule is stated in 46 
AmJur.2d Judges § 202, at 225-26 (1969): 
It is a well-recognized rule that an application for 
the disqualification of a trial judge must be filed at 
the earliest opportunity. The courts generally apply 
this rule with strictness against a party who, having 
knowledge of facts constituting a disqualification, 
does not seek to disqualify the judge until an 
unfavorable ruling has been made. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
[2] While the Utah rule imposes no specific time 
limitation on the filing of a motion for 
disqualification, timeliness is still essential. To be 
timely, a motion to disqualify should be filed at 
counsel's first opportunity after learning of the 
disqualifying facts. Only if good cause for a delay 
is demonstrated in the motion seeking 
disqualification should a delinquent motion even be 
considered. See Davis, 420 F.2d at 1282; Duplan 
Corp., 400 F.Supp. at 509-10. 
[3] Prudential's motion to disqualify Judge Rigtrup 
was not timely. Prudential claims that its first 
notice of bias on Judge Rigtrup's part occurred in 
his statement prior to announcing his ruling. 
However, Prudential's attorney did not object to the 
judge's continued participation in the case, as did 
opposing counsel, nor did Prudential ask for a 
continuance to consider disqualification. 
Prudential's attorney merely responded "that this is 
news to me" and then, after further dialogue with 
the judge, allowed the proceedings to continue 
without objection. By contrast, the Madsens' 
counsel did object to Judge Rigtrup's continuation 
as trial judge. 
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Prudential claims that Judge Rigtrup seemed 
determined to quell all interruptions as evidenced 
by his repeated admonition to plaintiffs' counsel to " 
sit down." Nevertheless, the record set out above 
demonstrates that plaintiffs' counsel was able to 
object. Beyond that, moments after Judge Rigtrup 
had delivered his oral ruling, he specifically 
afforded Prudential another opportunity to object: " 
Do you desire to make any farther exceptions...." 
Prudential's attorney responded: "Well, what I'm 
suggesting is that I expect that there will be an 
appeal before we get into the class issues, and I 
would anticipate findings and a judgment be 
presently entered in favor of Mr. Madsen." 
However, no mention was made of "recusal" or " 
disqualification." 
Prudential asserts that it did object at trial, but our 
review of the record discloses no objection. On the 
contrary, it discloses Prudential's apparent 
acquiescence in Judge Rigtrup's rendering a 
decision. 
Finally, Prudential waited thirty-nine days after the 
ruling to file a formal motion to disqualify. 
Prudential argues that it had good cause for the 
delay. It contends that the lengthy delay was 
necessary to review personal notes, discuss the 
matter with other counsel in related cases, discuss 
the matter with Prudential's officers, and order, 
receive, and review a partial transcript. However, 
the review of the attorney's notes and the 
discussions with others should have consumed no 
more than a day or two. We doubt that the 
transcript was essential; in any event, all the facts 
relating to disqualification were known to 
Prudential's attorney at the close of the proceedings 
and an affidavit of prejudice and motion to 
disqualify could have been prepared with only a 
knowledge of those facts. We see no reason why 
the affidavit of prejudice and motion to disqualify 
should have taken more than ten days to prepare 
and file, especially since this case was at an 
advanced stage. Prudential failed to act with 
sufficient promptness in a *544 matter which, by its 
very nature, requires promptness. 
In sum, Prudential's motion to disqualify was not 
filed "as soon as practicable after ... bias or 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim 
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prejudice is known," as required by Rule 63(b). 
Indeed, for all that appears, Prudential was not 
convinced at the time of the ruling that Judge 
Rigtrup should have recused himself. 
II. 
Given the importance of impartiality and the duty of 
a judge to recuse him- or herself sua sponte when 
necessary, we next address the issue of whether 
Judge Rigtrup should have disqualified himself on 
his own motion. In this context, we analyze the 
issues of apparent and actual bias raised by 
Prudential and addressed by Judge Fishier in his 
ruling. 
Standards for judicial disqualification are 
established by statute and the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which this Court adopted in 1974 and 
which is patterned after the ABA Code of Judicial 
Conduct of 1972. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 (1987) 
provides for disqualification if the judge is a party, 
has an interest in a case, is related to either party, or 
has been an attorney for either party in the action. FN4 
The statute allows a waiver of disqualification 
if both parties consent, a point not at issue here. 
FN4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 reads in 
full: 
Disqualification for interest or relation to 
parties. 
Except by consent of all parties, no justice, 
judge or justice of the peace shall sit or act 
as such in any action or proceeding: 
(1) to which he is a party, or in which he is 
interested. 
(2) when he is related to either party by 
consanguinity or affinity within the third 
degree, computed according to the rules of 
the common law. 
(3) when he has been attorney or counsel 
for either party in the action or proceeding. 
But the provisions of this section shall not 
apply to the arrangement of the calendar or 
the regulation of the order of business, nor 
to the power of transferring the action or 
proceeding to some other court. 
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Canon 3 C of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
(hereafter "Code") is more comprehensive than the 
statute in prescribing instances when judicial 
disqualification is warranted. In this case, the 
parties have based their arguments for and against 
disqualification on the Code. For this reason, we 
address the disqualification issues in the context of 
the Code. 
[4] The Madsens contend that the Code is an ethical 
code only and that a violation of the Code should 
not result in the invalidation of all of a judge's 
previous rulings. They argue that a violation 
should result only in discipline of the judge and not 
in a penalty to an innocent party who may have 
expended large amounts of time and money only to 
have a large part of the lawsuit invalidated because 
of a judicial disqualification. While most of the 
Code is aimed exclusively at the regulation of 
judicial behavior, Canon 3 C not only regulates 
judicial conduct, but it also seeks to avoid 
unfairness by insuring each litigant an impartial 
judge. Because we conclude that disqualification 
of the trial judge was not appropriate, we do not 
address further the issue of retroactive invalidation 
of a trial judge's rulings. 
Prudential argues that Judge Fishier was correct in 
disqualifying Judge Rigtrup because Judge Rigtrup 
had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary 
facts, displayed bias against Prudential, and had a 
financial interest in the outcome of the case. These 
allegations impute actual bias, but Judge Fishier 
specifically found no actual bias.FN5 Moreover, as 
shown below, *545 none of Prudential's allegations 
of bias withstands scrutiny. 
FN5. Obviously, actual bias need not be 
found to support disqualification. See 
State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 
(Utah 1988). An appearance of bias or 
prejudice is sufficient for disqualification, 
but even disqualification because of 
appearance must have some basis in fact 
and be grounded on more than mere 
conjecture and speculation. In close 
cases, disqualification is the favored 
course of action. However, 
disqualification is not automatic and the 
basis for disqualification should be 
thoroughly examined, especially in cases 
such as this which are at an advanced stage 
of the litigation process. See, e.g., In re 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 
364 (4th Cir. 1976). As is demonstrated 
elsewhere in this opinion, close 
examination of Prudential's allegations 
against Judge Rigtrup show them to be 
without merit. Therefore, there was no 
basis in this case for disqualification. 
We note that disqualification due to the 
appearance of bias or prejudice seems 
more amenable to prospective application. 
The purpose of disqualification based on 
appearance of bias is "to promote public 
confidence in the judicial system by 
avoiding even the appearance of partiality." 
Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. 
Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1986) 
, affd, 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 
L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). In Liljeberg v. 
Health Sei~vices Acquisition Corp., 486 
U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202-03, 100 
L.Ed.2d 855 (1988), the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that 
disqualifying facts which a federal district 
judge should have known but which he had 
forgotten were sufficient to disqualify the 
judge under the federal statute. However, 
the federal statute in question, 28 U.S.C. § 
455(a) (1982), requires disqualification for 
an appearance of bias. 
Canon 3 C(l) makes disqualification based 
on an appearance of bias discretionary ("A 
judge should disqualify himself ...") 
(emphasis added). 
First, Prudential argues that Judge Rigtrup had 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
and, thus, violated Canon 3 C(l)(a). The issue 
before Judge Rigtrup was whether Prudential 
earned a net profit on the Madsens' budget 
payments. Prudential claimed a net loss in the 
handling of such funds. Prudential asserts that it 
had waived insurance premium payments of certain 
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borrowers, including Judge Rigtrup, in 1977 and 
gave those borrowers the option of continuing their 
escrow accounts or discontinuing them altogether in 
1979. For that reason, Prudential asserts, the judge 
had independent knowledge of the disputed issue 
from which Judge Rigtrup "jumped to the 
conclusion in his ruling that Prudential could have 
and would have discontinued the Madsens' reserve, 
or otherwise changed its handling procedures, rather 
than lose money in requiring them." 
Judge Fishier was not persuaded that Judge Rigtrup 
had any knowledge conceniing the facts in dispute 
in this case and found that this allegation would not 
support a claim of bias. Judge Fishier was correct. 
Although Judge Rigtrup had knowledge of his own 
dealings with Prudential some six and eight years 
before the trial, that knowledge did not bear on the 
issue of whether Prudential made a profit on the 
budget payment accounts. Prudential cites no 
record support to the contrary. 
B. 
[5] Next, Prudential argues that remarks made by 
Judge Rigtrup just before delivering his ruling 
evidenced prejudice. Prudential specifically asserts 
here, as it did before Judge Fishier, that the remarks 
made by the judge, including the comment, "I have 
cussed financial institutions, ..." revealed a bias that 
warranted disqualification. Judge Fishler's 
memorandum decision does not mention this 
allegation as a basis for his disqualification order. 
Concededly, Judge Rigtrup was somewhat less than 
diplomatic in expressing what his thinking had been 
many years ago about financial institutions and how 
his thinking had evolved over the years. 
Nevertheless, Judge Rigtrup's own remarks in 
context explain the isolated instances thought by 
Prudential to show bias. The judge stated: 
I think I've made general comments throughout that 
I have cussed financial institutions, and customers 
do simply because they see inherent injustice about 
that. And my perspective today, after 23 years 
[have] passed, has become much, much different at 
the end of the 23 years. Far before that I could see 
the cost of money was markedly greater, and that I 
would be a damn fool to prepay. So I paid 
faithfully every month for 25 years, and not a day 
sooner or a day later. And I'm just commenting 
generally in terms of unjust or whatever. The 
tension is between that to be gained and that to be 
lost, I suppose, in my eyes. And I have a feeling 
that class actions are a form of champerty and 
maintenance in that the one that substantially gains 
is the lawyer or the expert. Mr. Madsen stands to 
gain little, except he has struck a blow for freedom, 
I suppose, in the form that the consumer has 
achieved balance. 
Later the judge stated:The tension is that in terms of 
the magnitude of the wear, what is to be *546 
gained by Mr. Madsen is de minimis. On the other 
hand, if the Court looks at economic realities, the 
high cost of money, high cost of labor and high cost 
of everything else, there is a societal interest in 
maintaining healthy, vital financial institutions that 
have the ability to fund building construction, 
homes, and so forth, in our community. And I 
simply observe that probably the savings and loan 
associations have been very instrumental and 
important in that particular process. I simply make 
those as an overview statement say to [sic] what has 
troubled me, and it's trouble[d] me for a long time. 
[6] Canon 3 C(l)(a) states that a judge should 
disqualify himself if he has "personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party." Although litigants 
are entitled to a judge who will hear both sides and 
decide an issue on the merits of the law and the 
evidence presented, they are not entitled to a judge 
whose mind is a clean slate. Each judge brings to 
the bench the experiences of life, both personal and 
professional. A lifetime of experiences that have 
generated a number of general attitudes cannot be 
left in chambers when a judge takes the bench. 
Refusing to disqualify himself in Laird v. Tatum, 
409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972), 
Justice Rehnquist responded to a motion to recuse 
nunc pro tunc: 
Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the 
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of 
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of 
lack of qualification, not lack of bias. 
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[N]either the oath, the disqualification statute, nor 
the practice of the former Justices of this Court 
guarantees a litigant that each judge will start off 
from dead center in his willingness or ability to 
reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with 
his understanding of the Constitution and the law. 
Id at 835, 838-39, 93 S.Ct. at 14, 15-16 
(memorandum opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (emphasis 
in original). One commentator has stated.Supreme 
Court Justices are strong minded men, and on the 
general subject matters which come before them, 
they do have propensities; the course of decision 
cannot be accounted for in any other way. 
J. Frank, Disqualification of Judges' In Support oj 
the Bayh Bill, 35 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43, 4*8 
(1970). Obviously, the same is true for all judges. 
Concerning comments made in court during a case, 
a commentator stated:The traditional judicial view 
is that if a judge can be disqualified for bias 
following a comment or ruling during the court 
proceedings, there is no limit to disqualification 
motions and there would be a return to "judge 
shopping." Any judicial comment or ruling gives 
the appearance of partiality in the broadest sense to 
the adversely affected party. Suppose a judge who 
is the trier of fact comments during a hearing that a 
parent has had the opportunity to improve himself 
in order to make a home for his child but has made 
no effort to do so. Can the judge be disqualified 
for bias and prejudice? Whenever a judge hears 
any evidence, he develops an attitude which may 
change as the evidence develops. As long as the 
judge decides the case only after all the evidence is 
submitted, there appears to be no harm in such a 
comment. Such judicial comments made before a 
jury would constitute an improper expression of 
opinion on the evidence, but those statements made 
out of their hearing do not require recusal. 
L. Abramson, Judicial Disqualification, at 23 
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). As long 
as a judge does not allow the "propensities" to 
obscure the evidence and will decide the case only 
after all the evidence is heard, then disqualification 
is generally not warranted by a judge's comments. 
See Banks v. Department of Human Resources, 141 
Ga.App. 347, 348-49, 233 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1977), 
overruled on other grounds, Chancey v. 
Department of Human Resources, 156 Ga.App. 
338, 340, 274 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1980). 
-547 Judge Rigtrup's remark that he had "cussed 
financial institutions" was simply a statement about 
an attitude he had had many years earlier, at a time 
when he was less knowledgeable about the 
operations of financial institutions. Viewed in its 
entirety and in the context in which that statement 
was made, there is no evidence of disqualifying bias 
in Judge Rigtrup's remarks. Indeed, it appears that 
Prudential saw no impropriety at the time the 
remarks were made, as demonstrated by its failure 
to object. 
C. 
[7] Prudential next contends that because Judge 
Rigtrup was at one time a Prudential borrower, he 
had a financial interest in the outcome of the case. 
Prudential claims that the judge is either a "potential 
" member of the existing plaintiff class or a " 
potential" member of an alleged plaintiff class 
which has never been certified. This "potential" 
membership, Prudential claims, gives Judge Rigtrup 
sufficient financial interest in the outcome of the 
case to warrant disqualification. Prudential asserts 
that amended complaints filed by the Madsens have 
added new legal theories to the case and have 
sought enlargement of the plaintiff class. The 
result, Prudential claims, is a plaintiff class whose 
boundaries are imprecise. 
Notwithstanding Prudential's assertions, this case 
has a precisely defined plaintiff class, consisting of 
Prudential borrowers whose trust deeds contain 
language identical to the Madsens' trust deed. The 
class was certified by Judge Croft in 1977. 
Prudential does not argue, and we find nothing in 
the record to indicate, that Judge Rigtrup is a 
member of that class. While it is true that the 
Madsens did seek to enlarge the class, a new 
plaintiff class has never been certified. Allegations 
alone do not act to enlarge an existing class. 
Judge Fishier held that Judge Rigtrup "may 
therefore have a financial interest which would be 
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substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding as defined under Canon 3C(l)(c)." 
(Emphasis added.) Judge Fishier erred. Judge 
Fishier and both sides on appeal have overlooked a 
critical point-the meaning of the term "financial 
interest" in Canon 3 C(3)(c). 
Canon 3 C(3)(c) states that " 'financial interest' 
means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, 
however small, or a relationship as director, 
advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a 
party...." (Emphasis added). In other words, 
without an ownership interest, no financial interest 
exists. 
In Virginia EJec & Power Co. v Sun Shipbldg. & 
Dry Dock Co., 407 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va.), vacated 
sub nom on other grounds In re Virginia Elec. & 
Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.1976), a trial 
judge was asked to disqualify himself because he 
was a customer of the plaintiff public utility, and a 
verdict favorable to the plaintiff could result in a 
personal benefit to the judge of approximately $100 
realized as a reduction in utility rates. The judge 
stated: 
Clearly, whatever interest the Court may have in the 
subject matter in controversy, it does not constitute 
a "financial interest" as defined [by the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and 28 U.S.C. § 455]. It has " 
ownership" of no interest-legal or equitable.... 
[T]he Court actually has "a vague and undefined 
interest, not ownership, in a credit or accounting 
adjustment...." 
407 F.Supp. at 327. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on other 
grounds but stated in its opinion that the trial judge 
correctly concluded that "he did not 'own' a legal 
or equitable interest in the subject matter." In re 
Virginia Elec & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 366 (4th 
Cir 1976). The appellate court noted that the trial 
judge's interest was analogous to a "bare expectancy 
in property law and concluded that "Judge 
Warriner 'owned' just what the owner of a bare 
expectancy has-nothing at all." Id at 367. 
Judge Rigtrup also owned nothing. Therefore, he 
had no financial interest in the case as defined by 
Canon 3 C(3)(c), and disqualification on this basis 
was unwarranted. 
*548 D. 
[8] Finally, while Prudential has not raised the 
issue, we briefly examine whether Judge Rigtrup's 
disqualification would be warranted under the 
portion of Canon 3 C(l)(c) which calls for 
disqualification when the judge or a close relative 
has "any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding...." The 
Reporter for the Code of Judicial Conduct 
interpreted "any other interest" to mean an 
economic interest, E. Thode, Reporter's Notes to 
Code of Judicial Conduct 63-61 (1973). UnlDce 
the term "financial interest," "any other interest" 
does not require ownership and includes lesser 
economic interests. At least one trial judge has 
disqualified himself after finding that "any other 
interest" includes the possibility of receiving a $100 
rebate on utility payments. Virginia Elec. & Power 
Co., 407 F.Supp. 324. It could therefore be argued 
that Judge Rigtrup's potential membership in an 
alleged class constitutes "any other interest" and 
requires disqualification. 
Although the term "any other interest" is usually 
confined to economic interests, further definition of 
the exact types of economic interests which fall 
under the ambit of the term is difficult.FN6 
FN6. For a discussion of the few cases 
which classify noneconomic interests as " 
any other interest," see L. Abramson, 
Judicial Disqualification, at 65; C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 13A 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3547, at 
605 (1984). See also Health Services 
Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 
796, 800 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1986), ajfd, 486 
U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 
855 (1988); Liljeberg v. Health Services 
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 
2194, 2206, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). 
In any event, the interest must be "substantially 
affected" to require disqualification. Professor 
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Wright has stated: "The concept [of 'any other 
interest5] is necessarily an imprecise one. It has 
been suggested that it should be read 'to depend on 
the interaction of two variables: the remoteness of 
the interest and its extent or degree.' " C. Wright, 
A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 13A Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3547, at 603 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). Another frequently cited article has 
illustrated the point as follows: 
If the interest strongly resembles a direct 
interest-for example, stock held in a subsidiary (or 
parent) of the corporate party-any amount should 
disqualify, just as does any stock held in the party 
itself. As the interest becomes less direct, such as 
that in an enterprise carrying on business with the 
party, only if the extent of the interest is itself 
substantial can the judge's impartiality reasonably 
be questioned. 
Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the 
Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 753 (1973) 
(footnote omitted). 
Courts which have considered the issue have 
followed this approach, examining both the nature 
of the interest and the extent of the interest. In In 
re Virginia Elec. and Power Co., the Fourth Circuit 
relied on that approach to hold that a trial judge's 
interest in a possible rebate on utility payments was 
a de minimis interest and that disqualification was 
not required. 539 F.2d at 368. See also Alaska Oil 
Co. v. Alaska, 45 Bankr. 358, 361-62 (D.Alaska 
1985). 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 
S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), is similar in 
significant respects to this case. In Aetna, the 
insurer discovered after an opinion had been issued 
that a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court who 
was the author of the per curiam opinion had filed 
two actions against insurers in state court alleging 
issues nearly identical to those presented to the 
court on appeal. One of the suits involved only 
that justice. The other was a class action in which 
the class apparently included all members of the 
Alabama Supreme Court. The United States 
Supreme Court addressed separately the 
disqualification issue with respect to the individual 
justice and the other members of the Alabama court 
as members of the uncertified class. The Court 
held that the individual justice should have recused 
himself because the opinion which he had authored 
had "the clear and immediate effect of enhancing 
both the legal status and the settlement value of his 
own case." *549475 U.S. at 824, 106 S.Ct. at 1586 
. However, the Court refused to hold that the other 
members of the Alabama court should have been 
disqualified because of their potential status as 
members of a class of plaintiffs in a class action 
lawsuit. The United States Supreme Court stated: 
Any interest that they might have had when they 
passed on the rehearing motion was clearly highly 
speculative and contingent. At the time, the trial 
court had not even certified a class, let alone 
awarded any class relief of a pecuniary nature.... 
At some point, "[t]he biasing influence ... [will be] 
too remote and insubstantial...." 
475 U.S. at 826, 106 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243, 100 
S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980)). 
In this case, Judge Rigtrup is, at most, a potential 
member of an alleged class. As such, his position 
is similar to eight of the nine justices of the 
Alabama Supreme Court in Aetna who might have 
found themselves class members. Under those 
circumstances, the United States Supreme Court 
refused to find in favor of disqualification, and we 
do likewise here. If any existing certified classes 
are expanded to include Judge Rigtrup or any new 
class were certified that included him, Judge 
Rigtrup would have to disqualify himself from 
further proceedings. We assume, of course, that he 
would not undertake to rule on a motion to certify a 
class or to expand a class if he could thereby 
become a party by virtue of his ruling. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the result. 
HALL, C.J., does not participate herein. 
Utah,1988. 
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i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
. Civrl No. 226073 
. JUDGE KENNETH R1GTRUP 
PREAMBLE 
On September 4, 5, and 6, 19 85, this case was tried to 
the Court without a jury. Plaintiff was represented by Robert J. 
DeBry. Defendant was represented by Joseph Palmer and Reid E. 
Lewis. 
Although this is a class action, the Court has ordered 
the parties to present evidence during this stage of the 
proceedings only for Madsen individually. 
At the outset of the trial, Madsen made a motion to 
bifurcate, and demanded a jury to hear evidence on a Statute of 
JT V SALT LAKS COUN CYft tf 
hBy-*-A—*^-—ti..£ .....' '** •« -
C\ Pi O r\ O / , 
Limitations issue: viz. when Madsen knew or should have known of 
Prudential's alleged misconduct (Motion to Bifurcate, August 27r 
1985). Prudential made a Motion to Strike the Jury Demand 
(August 30, 1985). The Court ruled that the discovery rule would 
not toll the statute of limitations and that the request for a 
jury trial was therefore denied. In making its ruling, the 
court announced that: 
(a) When the Madsens entered the contract, they got a 
copy of it and they had an opportunity to read it 
before they signed it. 
(b) The contract made no provision about interest 
specifically. 
(c) The Madsens knew or should have known about the 
absence of interest provisions in the contract. 
(d) The Madsens could have ascertained Prudential's 
financial circumstances if profits or interest had 
been of any concern to them. 
(e) The Madsens were members or shareholders of 
Prudential and, as such, they were entitled to 
examine business records and books and obtain a 
profit and loss statement and to inquire into 
such documents. 
Prudential contended that there were 24 additional 
2 
issues in the case. Prudential timely reserved the following 
issues in this case: 
(a) Whether the parties intended earnings to be paid 
or whether, considering all circumstances, including their 
conduct, the benefit the Madsens received, and the industry 
custom and practice, they intended a special agreement that 
earnings not be paid. 
(b) Whether the parties intended a true pledge 
relationship or a debtor-creditor relationship. 
(c) Whether the budget funds are pledged property or a 
commingled, fungible cash deposit. 
(d) Whether Prudential was unjustly enriched by use of 
the budget funds. 
(e) Whether payment of earnings on the Madsens' budget 
funds has been preempted by federal law and regulations of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board as a matter of fact and of law, 
since 1964. 
(f) Whether the Madsens have waived their claims, or 
they are barred by estoppel or laches from asserting them. 
(g) Whether the Madsens' budget account is a "short 
term savings account" within the meaning of 12 C.F.R. § 541.5. 
Prudential made the following offer of proof to support 
their affirmative defenses: 
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(a) Affidavit of Edwin Calvert. 
(b) Affidavit of Gibbs Marsh. 
(c) Prudential's Answers to Interrogatories. 
(d) Prudential's Charter (1977). 
(e) Deposition of Arthur Liebold. 
(f) Deposition of plaintiff Madsen. 
(g) Documents produced by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Boai~d. 
(h) Prudential's annual reports. 
(i) Briefs on appeal. 
(j) Unspecified testimony of Mr. Adams — an auditor 
of Prudential Federal. 
The offer of proof was received and denied. Ratherr 
the Court limited the scope of this trial to whether Prudential 
has earned a profit from the use of the pledged funds, and if so, 
for an accounting of those profits. (Compare, Order, dated 
September 3, 1985. ) 
With the case in this procedural posture, and after 
hearing evidence of the parties, the Court enters the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Madsen entered into a trust deed contract with 
Prudential on September 24, 1964. 
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2. Pursuant to this contract, Madsen was required to 
make monthly advance payments for anticipated taxes and 
insurance premiums. These advance payments were known as "budget 
payments." 
3. Payments were prompted by a monthly request for 
payment, or a bill from Prudential to Madsen. 
4. Madsen tendered a single check for his monthly 
payment. This single check included principle, interest and 
"budget payment". Madsen submitted this monthly payment together 
with a copy of the monthly bill or the billing stub. Prudential 
maintained separate accounting records to credit Madsen for 
payment of principle, interest and "budget" funds. 
5. Upon receiving each monthly payment, Prudential 
immediately deposited the entire check into its general 
operating account. 
6. Payments for Madsen's taxes and insurance premiums 
were taken out of this general account as needed periodically. 
The property taxes and insurance premiums were paid by Prudential 
on an annual basis. Prudential made annual reports to Madsen 
about the specific aJlocation and payment of Madsen budget funds 
for taxes and insurance premiums. 
7. Prudential also used this general operating 
account for routine business expenses such as office lease 
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payments, salaries, office machines, etc. 
8. Prudential invests most surplus funds from the 
general operating account in short term investments such as U.S. 
Treasury Bills, U.S. Treasury Notes, Certificates of Deposit, and 
certain Federal Agency obligations. However, Prudential also 
uses the same general operating account to make some longer term 
investments at higher yields. Prudential earns a profit on all 
of those investments. 
9. It is possible, by using Prudential's financial 
records, to determine the amount of income which Prudential has 
received by investing surplus funds from the general operating 
account. The Court has also determined that a portion of that 
income is attributable to Madsen's "budget" payments. The 
income attributable to Madsen's "budget" payments is set forth in 
Exhibit A attached. 
10. In computing that income (paragraphs 8 and 9 
above), the Court has assumed that the excess funds were invested 
in short term Treasury Bills because such Treasury Bills would be 
liquid and readily available to pay for Madsen's taxes and 
insurance when due. In fact, in addition to Treasury Bill 
investments, Prudential made other investments at higher yields. 
11. Prudential undergoes a number of procedural steps 
in order to process tax and insurance bills, and to pay those 
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amounts on behalf of Madsen. However, the Court specifically 
finds that Prudential would be performing many of those same 
steps with or without the "budget" payments. For example, 
Prudential sends a monthly statement to Madsen. However, 
Prudential would send that same statement to request the monthly 
mortgage payment even if there were no "budget" payments. 
12. Based upon the evidence in the record, the Court 
has found the costs which Prudential incurred in handling and 
managing the "budget" funds, including the cost of processing tax 
and insurance payments, as included in Exhibit A. 
13. The difference between income and expenses on 
Exhibit A represents profits or earnings which Prudential has 
realized by its use and investment of Madsen's "budget" funds. 
14. The Court finds it appropriate under the facts of 
this case to compound on an annual basis. The Court finds that 
Prudential must disgorge these compounded profits in order to 
make Madsen whole. The compounded earnings are included in 
Exhibit A. 
15. For the period of March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979, 
Prudential's earnings or profits realized by using Madsen's 
"budget" payments amount to $109.43. That amount is increased to 
$134.70 by compounding on an annual basis up to June 30, 1979. 
16. The combined table of the Court's findings on 
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profits or earnings is attached as Exhibit A. 
17 . It was not disputed that on or about July 25 
1979, Madsens received a letter from Prudential reproduced at 
Exhibit B of these findings (or, Exhibit A-l of Madsen's Third 
Amended Complaint). Exhibit B is the letter that Prudential 
mailed out based upon Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4. 
18. It was not disputed that Madsens responded to 
Prudential's letter of July 25, 1979 in a letter dated September 
4, 1979, reproduced at Exhibit C of these findings (or, Exhibit B 
of the Third Amended Complaint). 
19 . It was not disputed that Madsen did not withdraw 
his "budget account" from Prudential after receiving Prudential's 
letter of July 25, 1979. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The law of this case was set by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Assn., 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977), and by the Memorandum Decision 
of the Honorable Bryant Croft dated June 14, 1977. 
2. Specifically, the law of the case is that the 
"budget" payments made by Madsen for taxes and insurance 
constitute a common law pledge. If Prudential has realized any 
profits or earnings from the use of the pledged funds, Prudential 
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must disgorge those profits to Madsen. 
3. This case is an action for an accounting in 
equity. 
4. The applicable statute of limitations for this 
case is four years, pursuant to § 78-12-25 (2)
 r "An action for 
relief not otherwise provided for by Law." The complaint was 
fried on March 3, 1975. Therefore, the damage period shall begin 
on March 3, 1971. 
5. Damages terminate on June 30
 r 1979 by reason of 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4
 r is not an unconstitu-
tional impairment of contract under U.S. Constitution Article I, 
Section 10 or Utah Constitution Article I, Section 18. The 
notice sent by Prudential to Madsen (pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-17-4) does not offend the due process requirements of the 
U.S. Constitution or the Utah State Constitution since Madsen was 
represented by counsel who would advise him as to the legal 
effect of Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4. Furthermore, neither § 7-17-4 
nor the said notice take vested rights from Madsen in violation 
of Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7, or the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
7. The doctrine which would toll the statute of 
limitations until the injured party discovers or reasonably 
9 
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should have discovered the harmful conduct is not applicable to 
this case (see Preamble). 
8. The statute of limitations is not tolled by reason 
of Madsen's claim that a continuing illegal business practice 
should toll the statute. 
9. The "budget" account is not a "bank deposit" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34 . 
10. Prudential should be ordered to pay to Madsen the 
sum of $134.70 for profits or earnings Prudential has realized by 
using Madsen's "budget" payments for the period of March 3, 1971 
to June 30, 1979. 
11. Madsen is entitled to his costs of action. 
12. All class issues are reserved for further 
proceedings. 
13. Plaintiffs shall have simple interest at the 
annual rate of 10% on the damages awarded to them in the Court's 
ruling of September 6, 1985, calculated from that date to the 
entry of judgment. Plaintiffs shall not be allowed interest for 
any time prior to trial, for the reasons that the damages were 
not calculable before trial, that damage calculation at trial was 
subject to divergent evidence and viewpoints, especially between 
the parties' expert witnesses, that damages required a 
determination by the Court and that the Court was required to 
10 
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select one method of calculation from among several alternatives 
presented by the experts. 
DATED this IX "day of lf\V^h^ 1990. 
BY THE COUR! 
By: Um^^$ZMu 
HONORABLE KENNETH/TaGTRJ^P 
Approved as to Form: 
ROBfeRT J. DEB#Y 
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INTERNAL EXHIBIT A 
R. D. MADSEN 
AVERAGE ESCROW BALANCE 
AND LOST INCOME AT NET U.S. T-BILL YIELDS 
March 3, 1971 To June 30 1979 
Average Net Cumulative 
Average Average Expense Earnings Net 
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TOTALS; $109.43 $134.70 
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INTERNAL EXHIBIT C 
cCKTiri?:!) M A . J . . 
,<i)dcn t ia 1 F e d e r a l S a v i n g s t Lo.m /.:.:;oc: i a t ion 
J5 Sout l i Mam S t r e e t 
L i t ^ k c C i t y . U tah D4111 
He: :< ichard and Nancy .v--»d:cr*n 
Loan N'o. 33S-01^f. 11 -0 
Gen 11 c»»cn : 
Mr. and Mrs. Madscn have consulted this office in 
coanccLion with your letter of July 2 5, 19 79 entitled. Notice 
0 Homeowners. - Reserve Accounts for Payments of Taxes and 
lrnTurancc. 
It appear:; that yonr letter is in violation of the 
express provisions of the Interest on Hort^acc .Loan Reserve 
Accounts Act. S 7-17-1. c: tE}i" ' l-,-**l!l <-"odc Ann.* (1953). 
Specifically, your letter has c]ajn.od protection under 
5*7-17-4 Utah Code Ann. [l'J53); however, <; 7-rJ7-'J is clearly 
not applicable to the Madscn contract. That section provides 
in part: 
(1) A lender not requiring the establishment 
and ir^intcnancc of a reserve account shall 
offer the borrower the following options: 
We have examined the Kadscn contract- As you hnov, 
the contract contains a provision requirinq the riadscr. s to 
make monthly payments into the" Reserve Accounts ^-^c arc'told 
by the Kad'scns that they had no choice in the natter. The 
contract was presented to them on a "take it or leave it" 
basis. In short. Prudential has already "required ~ the >Vadsens 
to pay into the reserve account, and that requirement has been 
reduced to a written agreement. That recruircnent vill, -of 
course, continue to exist for the life of the contract. Thus 
it seems fair to conclude that the existing contract constitutes 
a continuing requirement. 
:-.'e :if: nut aware of :.ny .locirinc by which I'rudL-ncicl 
can now "urircrjuirc" a reserve account - Stated in other words, 
Prudential cinnot un i 1 a t c:r.">J ly cha:'i«;<* ;'nC critter, contract. 
Nor can the legislature change the written contract. 
This analvsis in con f i rm-':d by the- u*c of the word 
and in the first sentence of S 7-17-4. Note that the word 
a_mi is i" the conjunct ive. In other word:;, Prudential is 
entitled to the protection of 5 7-17--3 only where both conditions 
exist conjunctively: 
First, the lender does not require the 
establishment of a reserve account, 
scconti, the lender doer, not requir-c the 
ma in t ••nc-nce of a reserve account. 
I'r.i-l'-ni. i:d can never ~at. is!y both? of rh*v.e condition:; 
on cxictinu Jo.i:is. liven jf Prudential rlocr r.ot rc-qjire the 
r.^ inLCii.'::icc* of a reserve- account in fui.-.irn; Prudential has 
nonetheless already rencircd such a reserve for tLhc pant several 
years.. The ror.orvc account lias already beim established. Tims'' 
Prudential can nc\:cr satisfy the 1 i rr-t rondition of S* 7-17-M. 
On the other hand, 5 7-17-2, Utah Code Ann. (lrJS3), 
i r. drafted in :.nc di :;i imct i ve : 
(1) Mach lender requiring the en tabl i:;.hmen t. 
or continuance of -a reserve account''i~H con-
nection vith an c>:i ::t inc: or future z~hl estate 
loan shall pay interest on fund:; deposited in 
the account after June 30, 197 9 c.r at least 
-11 -j i .-nj--le interest per anncm .... 
Thus, Prudential would fall under 5 7-17-3 if it had 
rercuired the establishment of a reserve account or if Prudential 
required the continuancc . of a reserve account. Prudential has 
already required the establishment of the reserve account by 
contract: Tim.', $ 7-17-3 is satisfied. Since the statute is 
d ra f t e*d in tin: d i s j unc i ivo, it r ca 11 y na y.t'S no r: i f f c :" en C c " a t 
all that rrcdeatiai r.\z\y r.nir.ehov; discontinue that recu i rerr.cnt 
in the future^ Section 7-17-3 is satisfied si:t::;Jy because 
Pruv.cat: :»1 r^-.'jirc-j the ~CF.c.rv<: account in the c:-:istine contract. 
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j- is not ncccns:.ry that both conditions be satisfied. 
This all bulls clovn to .« f.iirJy simple scenario, 
prudential h»is r.cnt out a scries of letters announcing that 
(•he i>o 3 icy of rcuuirinij a rt^ui'vc a'jr. %:••.:; it has been reversed. 
prudential nc::: claims ch.u it ir. entitled to the protection 
of S 7-17-< because it has no ;-oJi'ry. f'^ r-ui r J n«:j a reserve 
.nccount. The fallacy in ull o( L h J r jr. that the rcc:u i renent 
for a reserve account arises froir a con crjct—no: a t>ol icy. 
The contract continues to c>:ist. 3t cannot be chanucd at the 
rncrc wnim and caprice of Prudential. The con: ract constitutes 
3 continuing i*e*ju i rcmc-.ni . Since lT'idi-n t la ] ' s contract requires 
the reserve account, the t ransaction falls under 5 7-1*7-3. 
In vicv/ of the foregoing, vc arc convinced that the 
Hadscn contract doc:; not Tall under 5 7-17-4.- Thus, pursuant 
Xjj $ 7-17-U(2), Utah Code- Ann. (19r>3), ^c he rev i th demand 
payment of interest pursuant to 5 7-17-3, Utrh Code /-sin. (1V53). 
If you fail to honor this deirjand, it is O'jr^ -intcr.t to file suit 
pursuant to 5 7-17-BU), Utah Code Ann. (19-55). 
If is further ii'^ pi'o.nt that Prudentiul "bas sent 
similar or identical notices to other borrowers. Therefore/ 
pursuant to 5 7-17-3(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953), we make this 
demand OTI beha I : of the ;n;!:;nis .i:-\\l all other borrowers _of 
Prudential similarly situated. 
Moreov-.-r, we arc- informed that every lending 
institution in Utah has sent letters in s-.ibstan.ee ar.d .effect 
identical tu the Madscn letter. It is i r. conceivable that all 
of these lend 2 u-.; institutions could nisread the s ir.pl c lancuaac 
of the statute. leather, wc conclude that: this :.;ar3llcl conduct' 
is the result of * conspiracy by Utah 3 endi.-,'; ir.s tit ut ions to 
circumvent the r»-euir enents of L* 7-}~.:-2. P.y reason of such 
industry-vi.de- practice and conspiratorial conduct, all" Utah 
lend in 9 institutions are juridically related and subject to 
treatment as a defendant class under Kulc 2 3 of die Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Thus, by copy o f this letter, v:c .T.ake 
demand under 5 7-17-3(2) on bchaif 01 all borrowers in the 
StOUC oC ULJih u-lio IKIVC r c c c i vcxi l«-t L-'fN :rom .\:.y i»i*ih lond< 
in s u b s ^ n c r nn*.\ e f f e c t «> i r.:i ] .1 r I t . i l i r >:.i'l::^n 1-. t i ter . 
. " i n c ^ r c l r y o u r 
j-;niK!rL J. i^.-liry J 
JUD/chh 
cc; : Al 3 Utah i i t . ' i t c li;i:ih:;; 
A l l N a t i o n a l i i anhs wiLli L h c i i 
- p r i n c i p a l p l» ice of busiric-s.*; i n t i i c S t . i t o of U t a h ; 
A l l S t a t e f» : iv inc ;3 / r : i i i l i l )nns .inJ I-o-^n A s s o c V o t i o n s 
w i t h t h e i r p r i n c i p a l pJ :iCiv of Lr.:::£ m : s s I n L:iC: 
f . rnLe of i'i :iii; 
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b e : Mr. R i c h a r d Kadscn 
WALLACE R. BENNETT - A02 8 6 
1723 South 2100 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1516 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, for 




PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
MOTION THAT MASTER PERFORM AN 
AUXILIARY COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES 
(AT PLAINTIFFS' EXPENSE) FOR 
PERIODS PRIOR TO MARCH 3, 1971 
AND FOR PERIODS AFTER JUNE 3 0, 
1979 
Trial No. 750226073 
Civil no. C79-8404 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
This Court has previously entered Orders that the Master 
compute damages for class members for the period March 3, 1971 to 
June 30, 1979. 
Plaintiffs move for an Order that the Master perform an 
auxiliary computation of damages (at plaintiffs' expense) for the 
Periods prior to March 3, 1971 and after June 30, 1979. In support 
°f this Motion, plaintiffs' rely on the memorandum filed herewith. 
tilth • . 1 996. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
• ) 
i 
1/.,/ j^iif LArrn 
ROBERT J . DEBR1 
(JJ'MI^O- A- Ot^i+lf 
WALLACE R. BENNETT ( 4 7 £jf?J 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION THAT MASTER PERFORM AN AUXILIARY COMPUTATION OF 
DAMAGES (AT PLAINTIFF'S EXPENSE) FOR PERIODS PRIOR TO MARCH 3, 1971 
AND FOR PERIODS AFTER JUNE 30, 1979 (Madsen v. Prudential) , was 
HAND DELIVERED this 3d day of fad- , 1996, to the following: 
Joseph J. Palmer 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, #900 
SLC, UT 84111 
Edwin Erickson (Master) 
HANSEN, STEED, BRADSHAW & MALMROSE 
2 61 East Broadway, Suite 10 0 
SLC, UT 84111 
via hand delivery 
via hand delivery 
' Vt&~ ^UJUMU\ 
s p ! 9 . 1 1 4 / l k 
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WALLACE R. BENNETT - A02 8 6 
1723 South 2100 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1516 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, for 




PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION THAT MASTEI 
PERFORM AN AUXILIARY COMPUTATIOl 
OF DAMAGES (AT PLAINTIFFS' 
EXPENSE) FOR PERIODS PRIOR TO 
MARCH 3, 1971 AND FOR PERIODS 
AFTER JUNE 30, 1979 
Trial No. 750226073 
Civil no. C79-8404 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
This Court has previously ordered the Master to prepare 
a damage computation for all class members for the period March 3 
1971 to June 30, 1979. The court selected the June 30, 1979 cut 
off by reason of § 78-12-25(2), Utah Code Ann. (See Conclusion o 
Law No. 4, March 22, 1990.) The court selected the June 30, 197 
cut-off by reason of § 7-17-4, Utah Code Ann. (See Conclusion o 
Law No. 5, March 22, 1990.) 
These cut-off dates were vigorously contested b 
plaintiffs, and they are not free from doubt. However, those cut 
off dates now stand, and the Master is poised to begin a monumental 
task of computing damages for up to 10,000 class members for the 
above-described window of time. 
This case is now over 2 0 years old. If the court erred 
in computing the cut-off dates, the supreme court would be required 
to send the Master back to recompute the damages for periods 
outside that window. Of course, the Master would then be required 
to reassemble all of the records and start all over again. More 
years would be added. 
It is respectfully submitted that the risk of delaying 
this case for even more years can be avoided by simply permitting 
the Master, at plaintiffs7 expense,1 to perform damage computations 
for time periods which plaintiffs believe to be relevant. Then, if 
an appellate court comes to a different conclusion, on the 
applicable window of time, it would be a simple matter to adjust 
the amount of the judgment. 
Finally, plaintiffs have offered to pay the cost of the 
Master for this supplemental calculation;2 however, plaintiffs 
specifically offer to pay only the incremental increase, and not a 
pro-rata share. For example, the current damage window is approx-
imately 8 years. Plaintiffs might seek an auxiliary computation 
for an additional (say) 16 years. However, plaintiffs are not 
1If the Appellate Court reverses this Court on the applicable 
window of time, plaintiffs reserve the right to claim reimbursement 
for these costs in any subsequent proceeding. 
2But see fn. 1. 
2 
offering to pay 2/3s (or 16/24ths) of the Master's cost. Rather 
defendant should pay the entire cost of the core -- 8 year -
study. Plaintiffs would then pay the incremental cost of th< 
actual time needed for the Master to keep extending his computa 
tions for the extra years. 
DATED t h i s Ai day of (liMjuL , i 9 9 6 . 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
/"\ 
, ujSU-V 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
WALLACE R. BENNETT 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION THAT MASTER PERFORM AN 
AUXILIARY COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES (AT PLAINTIFF'S EXPENSE) FOR 
PERIODS PRIOR TO MARCH 3, 1971 AND FOR PERIODS AFTER JUNE 30, 1979 
(Madsen v. Prudential), was HAND DELIVERED this day of 
to the following: 
Joseph J. Palmer 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, #900 
SLC, UT 84111 
Edwin Erickson (Master) 
HANSEN, STEED, BRADSHAW & MALMROSE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 100 
SLC, UT 84111 
via hand delivery 






ROBERT J. DEBRY 
A N D A S S O C I A T E S 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Ph (801)262-8915 
Fx (801)262-8995 
vyv.ToJb'Sfta e'ifrf. e 
Judicial 
January 10, 2002 
Edwin Erickson, CPA 
HANSEN, BRADSHAW, MALMROSE & ERICKSON 
261 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Mad sen v Prudential- Aggregate Accounting 
1425 South State Street 
Orem, Utah 84097 





243 East St. George Blvd. S 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph (435) 656-0198 
Fx (435)688-9421 
Toll Free (800) 909-3500 
QGDEN 
3340 S Harrison Blvd Ste 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Ph (801)392-9800 
Fx (801)392-9400 
Toll Free (888) 786-2824 
-15 v L?D' 
Dear Mr Erickson, 
According to the Court's Order of January 2, 2002 (copy attached) you will now be 
performing the statistical computation for aggregate class damages Of course, the window for 
those computations (as ordered by Judge Rigtrup) will be March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979. 
However, we would like to remind you that the court has given us permission to have you 
preform an auxiliary computation of damages (at our expense) for the time period prior to March 
3, 1971 and after June 30, 1979. (Motion, Memo and Order attached.) Also note from p. 2 and 
p 3 of the attached memorandum that we will be paying only the incremental increase in your fee 
for computing these damages. 
Unless we hear from you to the contrary, we are assuming that you will be performing 
these auxiliary calculations at the same time as you prepare the core calculations for the years 
1971 to 1979 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Robert J DeBiy/ 
Attorney 
Attachments 
cc Steven Tingey 
Judge Burton 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADDEN, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, : CASE NO. 750226073CV 
vs. : HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA 
MARCY THORNE, COURT CLERK 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
On January 9, 1998, the above-entitled matter came on for oral 
argument on several motions. At the hearing, the parties were 
represented by their respective counsel. The motions argued and 
submitted include the following: (1) Prudential's Renewed Motion to 
Decertify; (2) Prudential's Motion to Amend Bench Ruling; (3) 
Prudential's Amended Motion for Instructions to the Master; (4) 
Plaintiffs' Motion (and Second Motion) to Amend Conclusion of Law 
#5; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law #13 or 
Finding of Fact #15 and Prudential's Motion to Amend Conclusion of 
Law #10 and #13 and Finding of Fact #14 and #15; (6) Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law Based Upon New Case Law and 
Motion to Reopen the Trial for the Limited Purpose of Making 
Findings on Statute of Limitations Issue; (7) Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Order that Prudential is not Entitled to Any Reversion of 
Unclaimed Funds; and (8) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Class 
/ ^f S\ I 
MADDEN v. PRUDENTIAL 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Definition. 
At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court took the motions 
under advisement. The Court has now carefully considered the 
motions, the written memoranda and exhibits supporting the motions, 
the arguments of counsel and the good cause that has been shown. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court hereby enters the following 
ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
1. The Madsens are trustors as well as representatives of a 
certified class of borrowers. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association is both the trustee and the beneficiary under a deed of 
trust executed September 21, 1964, for the purpose of securing a 
promissory note in the sum of $16,800. The security conveyed was 
the home in which plaintiffs reside. 
2. Plaintiffs, as the trustors, agreed to protect the 
security of Prudential by paying the insurance and taxes. Ir 
addition, they agreed to pay ^budget payments" and pledge these 
additional amounts to the beneficiary as additional security for 
the full performance of the deed of trust and the note securec 
thereby. 
3. Contending that the monthly budget payments undei 
Provision 4 of their contract constitute a common law pledge, 
plaintiffs sought restitution of profits allegedly earned. 
4. This action was tried in September 1985 before the 
MADDEN v. PRUDENTIAL 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. Judge Rigtrup entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in 1990. The case was tried only as to 
plaintiffs' claims individually, and the class claims were 
reserved. 
5. On December 2, 1996, Judge Rigtrup entered his bench 
ruling concerning the definition of the purported class represented 
in this action. 
6. On December 31, 1996, Judge Rigtrup retired from the 
bench. Subsequently, on April 21, 1997, the case was re-assigned 
by the presiding judge of the Third District Court to the 
undersigned. 
7. On October 31, 1997, this Court entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as to the definition of the purported class 
represented in this action. 
ANALYSIS 
This case was initially filed in 1975: the year the 
undersigned judge started law school. The case is now nearly 23 
years old. 
Most of these current motions seek a reconsideration by this 
Court of several issues already decided by Judge Rigtrup and other 
judges a long time ago. Because of the extremely protracted nature 
of this case, the Court feels compelled to express its serious 
concern over the repeated attacks on legal issues that have been 
considered and decided previously (in some instances by more than 
MADDEN v . PRUDENTIAL 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
one judge) . * 
This approach is not the product of just one side of the 
dispute. Both sides have engaged in requests for reconsideration.1 
Based upon the Court's consideration of the current motions, 
there is no adequate basis in law or fact for reconsideration of 
(1) Prudential's Renewed Motion to Decertify; (2) Prudential's 
Motion to Amend Bench Ruling; (3) Prudential's Amended Motion for 
Instructions to the Master; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion (and Second 
Motion) to Amend Conclusion of Law #5; and (5) Plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend Conclusion of Law #13 or Finding of Fact #15; and these 
motions are, consequently, denied. 
Prudential's "Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law #10 and #13 
and Finding of Fact #14 and #15," is hereby denied, except that 
Judge Rigtrup's award to plaintiffs of the simple interest at th€ 
annual rate of 10% on damages from the date of the conclusion oi 
trial but prior to the entry of judgment, is hereby vacated on the 
ground a judgment is entered when the judgment is actually signec 
and entered, and an award of prejudgment is, therefore 
inappropriate. 
As to Plaintiffs' "Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law Base 
Upon New Case Law and Motion to Reopen the Trial for the Limite 
Although the parties contend that the law authorizes th 
Court to reconsider these issues, perhaps they ought to give mor 
consideration as to whether, in good judgment and conscience, ther 
ought to be a reconsideration. 
i 
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Purpose of Making Findings on Statute of Limitations Issue," 
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the use of the discovery 
rule is justified under Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 
(Utah 1992); and, therefore, there is no basis under Sevy v. 
Security Title, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), to amend the Conclusions 
of Law or to re-open the trial. 
With regard to Plaintiffs' "Motion for Order that Prudential 
is not Entitled to Any Reversion of Unclaimed Funds," a ruling on 
this motion is deferred until such time as the Court considers 
other possibly competing claims on the judgment proceeds at the 
conclusion of the case. At this time, there are simply too many 
unknowns regarding the number of claimants, the amount owed to 
each, and the amounts to be disbursed, for this issue to be 
appropriately resolved. The notice to submit as to this motion is 
therefore hereby stricken. The motion may be re-submitted for 
decision at such time as the Court considers all other claims on 
the judgment proceeds. 
Finally, the issues raised in Plaintiffs' "Motion to Enlarge 
Class Definition" are remanded to the Special Master for an 
assessment and recommendation, in accordance with the directives 
previously established by Judge Rigtrup, as to whether the class 
includes those parties in trust deed contracts identified as 
documents 12, 14 & 15 on Exhibit C of the Master's initial Report 
dated February 22, 1995. The Special Master shall file an 
Hansen, Bradshaw, Malmrose & Erickson 
A Professional Corporation «ggg &* a* &****«»**_ F
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Honorable Michael K. Burton 
Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Dear Judge Burton: 
This letter is our Report to the Court as required by the Court in its Order 
dated January 2, 2002. This Order specified the following: 
The Master shall, within 60 days of this order, produce to the Court a Report 
giving the Master's final statistical calculation of aggregate class damages. 
Furthermore for purposes of this report, if the mailing address and the 
property address are identical on the Mortgage Loan Master Reference Card 
(sample attached), the Master shall assume that such loans involve ''primary 
residence", as that terms is used in prior Orders of the Court. 
To accomplish this objective I met with Brad Slack at Washington Mutual to 
review the data base that he had prepared of the loan origination cards. This data 
base was prepared by Mr. Slack and other Washington Mutual Bank employees 
under his direction, as outlined in his August 7, 2000 affidavit filed with the Court. 
This process resulted in a data base of 14,482 loan cards. It should be noted that I 
have only performed a limited amount of testing of this data base, primarily in 
obtaining a sample of 50 loan cards to respond to plaintiff counsel's request of 
December 27, 2000. I have not yet performed testing to determine if all loan cards 
have been properly segregated between class members and non-members of the 
class. Based on the limited testing I have performed and based on my meetings and 
discussions with Mr. Slack, I have seen no evidence that the process of segregating 
the loan cards and developing the data base was not performed with due care. 
The data base includes information regarding the mailing address of the 
borrower, as well as the property address as listed on each loan origination card. 
We requested that Mr. Slack print the entire data base and mark each borrower 
name where the loan address and property address did not agree. In performing this 
task, he also noted a third group of borrowers; those where it is not possible to 
determine if the mailing address and the property address are the same. There are 
two primary reasons for this classification; the first is when the property address is 
listed on the card but the mailing address is a P.O. box, the second is when a legal 
description of the property is listed as the property address. Mr. Slack marked this 
third category as well on the printout of the database. 
After Mr. Slack completed the process of marking the data base printout for 
the three different categories, we obtained the printout from him. We tested the 
accuracy of his work by reviewing the printout and looking for any items which 
appeared to be improperly classified, based on the information listed. We found a 
small number of exceptions, and met with Mr. Slack to discuss the exceptions. He 
then made the appropriate corrections on the printout. 
We then met again with Mr. Slack to sort the data base into the three 
categories: 
1. Borrowers where the mailing address and property address agree. 
2. Borrowers where the mailing address and property address did not 
agree. 
3. Borrowers where it was indeterminable if the mailing address and 
property address agree. 
As noted above, there were 14,482 total loans in the data base. This sorting 
process identified 10,796 loans in category 1, 3,192 loans in category 2, and 494 
loans in category 3. Of the 10,796 loans in category 1 where the addresses match, 
there are 1,249 loans which are duplicated on the listing. Of the 494 loans in 
category 3, 30 are duplicate loans within the listing and an additional 57 are 
duplicates when compared to category 1. Duplication occurs primarily from 
assumption of the same loan by one or more subsequent borrowers. We considered 
whether duplicate loan numbers should be included in the estimate of aggregate 
damages and concluded they should be excluded. We arrived at this conclusion 
after considering the methodology used by Prudential in conducting its sample in 
1993, from which we use data as described below in developing our estimate of 
aggregate damages. After subtracting the duplicate borrowers, the adjusted total of 
category 1 loans (where the property and mailing address match) was 9,547. 
As discussed in our Report to the Court dated December 31, 1996, 
Prudential used the December 31, 1972 mortgage loan microfiche records as the 
population for its sample. For each of the 400 loans selected in its sample, 
Prudential obtained the annual statement summaries for the loan for each year from 
1971 to 1979. The damage calculations were performed for the entire period the 
loan was outstanding from 1971 to 1979, whether the loan was assumed or not. 
Prudential's damage calculations for its sample were on a per loan basis, rather than 
per individual borrower. 
As noted in our December 31, 1996 Report to the Court, the amount of 
damages for the 227 potential class loans from the sample totaled 23,875.69, or an 
average of $105.18 per class member or loan. For the purposes of this Report as 
directed by the Court, we believe this per loan sample average is meaningful and can 
be used to develop our estimate of aggregate damages, as follows: 
Number of loans where property address 
and mailing address agree 9,547 
Average damages per loan, from 1993 sample, 
for period March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979 $ 105.18 
Estimate of aggregate damages $1,004 J 53 
This aggregate damage estimate excludes any judgement interest subsequent 
to June 30, 1979. 
If the category 3 or indeterminable loans were included in the above estimate, 
they would increase the estimate by a maximum of $42,808 if all of the non-
duplicate total of 407 loans were found to be category 1 loans. 
As previously noted, the completeness and accuracy of the data base has not 
been extensively tested. I would point out that the process used by Washington 
Mutual to develop this data base resulted in 9,547 loans identified, as described 
above. Our December 31, 1996 report to the Court arrived at an estimated 9,648 
class members, based on the 1993 sample performed. The sample estimate of 9,648 
is a close approximation of the 9,547 arrived at by individual examination of loan 
cards by Washington Mutual to prepare the data base, and provides additional 
evidence of the overall reasonableness of the class member size. While the exact 
number of class members may not be known at the present time, I believe we have a 
reasonable estimate of class member loans that can in turn be used to provide an 
overall estimate of aggregate damages. 
The following are certain of the statistical parameters used by Prudential in 
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Edwin L. Erickson, CPA 
ELExp 
Hansen, Bradshaw, Malmrose & Erickson 
A Professional Corporation 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
559 West 500 South 
Bountiful Unh 84010 
801 296 0200 
Fax 801 296 1218 
September 12, 2003 
PIonoiablcL A Devei 
Third Judicial District Court 
450 South State Stieet 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
RE Madsen vs Prudential 
Civil No C79-8404 
Trial No 750226073 
Dear Judge Dever 
This lettei is in lesponse to Plaintiffs motion that the Court oidei the 
Master to Appeal and Show Cause why he Should not be Held in Contempt of 
Court dated Julv 10, 200\ and to Plaintiff s ReoK to Prudential's Memotandum in 
Opposition to Madsens' Motion that Special Mastei Show Cause Wny lie Shou'd 
Not be Held m Contempt, dated August 27, 2003 
I apologize to the Couit lot not lesponJiug soonei, 1 mistakenly assumed 
the Court would order me to appear and respond to the original motion if deemed 
necessary by the Couit 
To prepare my response, I have obtained and reviewed the May ^0, 2003 and 
August 26, 2003 affidavits of Andiew Carr Conway, Ji , as well as defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Madsens' Motion that Special Mastei Show Cause 
Why He Should Not be Held in Contempt dated August 4, 2003 
It appeals the main aiguments piesented by Mi Conway and plaintiffs 
counsel is that I have not followed niofcssional sldndaids and that I have tued to 
deceive the Couit Specifically, they allege my use of "negative assuiance' in my 
March I, 2002 Repott to the Couit violates ceitain Geneially Accepted Auditing 
Standaids (GAAS) they believe aie applicable to the woit I have peilorned a^  
Special Mastei They also allege deceit on my part for not disclosing that my repoit 
violated piolessional standards, as well as foi claiming that I had perfoimed a 
limited amount of testing ol the loan caid data base My response to these 
allegations follows 
Alleged Violation of Professional Standards 
Mr. Conway, on page 3 of his August 26, 2003 affidavit, states his professional opinion is 
that "the requirements within the professional literature for consulting engagements are parallel to 
those in the 'audit literature' ". He concludes that "sufficient relevant data" under Consulting 
Services Standards is similar or even parallel to evidential matter as discussed in GAAS (AU 
Section 326). He concludes in paragraph II that my use of "negative assurances" in my March 1, 
2002 Report are improper and violate GAAS and/or Consulting Services Standards. On page 2 of 
his affidavit, he also questions the ability of Mr. Tingey and Ms. Maragakis to make judgments 
about "what constitutes an audit" as recognized by the accounting profession. 
For the record, I have been a CPA for over 25 years. I have worked almost exclusively as 
an audit staff member, senior, manager, senior manager and partner for two national CPA firms and 
for a local CPA firm. I have also taught audit courses at the university level for two years. Based 
on my experience and background, let me state clearly THIS ENGAGEMENT IS NOT AN 
AUDIT. Mr. Conway's criticisms of my using negative assurances are based o^ prohibilions of 
using such assurances in expressing an audit opinion. He also states in his May 30, 2003 affidavit 
on page 12 that "such language is called 'negative assurance' and is generally viewed with 
disapproval by the accounting profession except in certain very limited circumstances". I disagree 
that this language is viewed "with disapproval" and only used in "very limited circumstances". A 
few examples will suffice. 
When CPAs issue a review report on financial statements under AICPA Statements on 
Standards for Accounting and Review Services, they are required to use negative assurance, i.e., 
"We are not aware of any material modifications that should be made to the accompanying 
financial statements ...". Similarly, when a CPA reports on compliance with contractual provisions 
or regulatory requirements related to audited financial statements, he is required to "provide(s) 
negative assurance relative to compliance with the applicable covenants of the agreement insofar as 
they relate to accounting matters, and specify that the negative assurance is being given in 
connection with the audit of the financial statements". (AU 623, para 20 (c)). Finally, when CPAs 
issue "comfort letters" to underwriters in connection with unaudited financial statements included 
in public offerings, they are "limited to providing negative assurance on compliance as to form and 
content of financial statements..." (AU 634.34). I believe these examples clearly demonstrate 
negative assurance is commonly used and not "viewed with disapproval by the accounting 
profession". 
As for my reason for using negative assurance in my March 1, 2002 Report, I clearly felt 
this was the most appropriate and descriptive language, given the limited amount of work I had 
performed to that point. I was careful to point out, both on page 1 and page 3 of my Report, that the 
loan data base had not been extensively tested. Based on the testing ] had performed, I felt it would 
have been irresponsible of me to express positive assurance that all loan cards had been properly 
segregated. Remarkably, plaintiffs counsel confuses the issue o\^ my providing negative assurance 
in my Report to falsely stating in their August 27, 2003 Memorandum "he (the Master) relied on 
'negative assurances' from officers of Prudential in preparing that March 1, 2002 Report." I 
assume this misstatement was an honest mistake on Counsel's part and not "deceit"! 
At this point, a little background may be helpful. In the hearing before Judge Burton on 
January 2, 2002, and in previous motions before the Court, there was discussion of whether class 
damages would be calculated on an individual or aggregate basis. Judge Burton ordered a 
"statistical calculation of aggregate class damages" using certain criteria to define class members. 
Also, both sides in this case have repeatedly made reference to ''certain appeals" of the Court's 
final decisions. It seemed the Court's interest and intent was to obtain an estimate that could be 
used as a step to help expedite a resolution of the case. As I stated in my letter to Mr. DeBry of 
April 23, 2003 (see Exhibit A attached) in paragraph 4, "of course, as this matter progresses to the 
point where damages are distributed to class members, we will perform additional testing to confirm 
proper identification of class members and completeness of the data base". I concluded and still 
believe that the work performed was sufficient to provide the Court with a reasonable estimate upon 
which to make further decisions. As I noted in my March i, 2002 Report, the data base consists of 
9,547 loans identified, which is a close approximation of the 9,648 estimated number based on 
sampling procedures described in my December 31, 1996 Report to the Court. As I stated then, I 
believe the comparability of these two numbers provides additional evidence of the overall 
reasonableness and accuracy of the class member size. 
Alleged Deception of the Court 
The second issue presented by plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Conway is that 1 attempted to 
deceive the Court by stating I had performed a limited amount of testing in relation to the loan 
cards. As you are aware, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, I went to Prudential offices in 
December 2000 where the loan cards are kept. I discussed with Mr. Slack the piocess he and his 
staff followed to segregate the loan cards between potential class and non-clasj members I 
obtained copies of 50 loan cards which I selected at random. I obtained 33 cards included in the 
class, 17 cards which had been excluded. These loan cards contain information which identify 
whether they are conventional, FHA, VA, or other types of loans. Based on obtaining this sample 
of loan cards, and my discussions with Mr. Slack, I believed it appropriate to state I had 
"performed a limited amount of testing". Mr. Conway's August 26, 2003 affidavit does not 
dispute whether I performed any testing, but instead states "I can see absolutely no way that an 
examination of fifty loan cards from a total universe of 70,000 loan cards, could in any way be 
referred to as a 'limited amount of testing' sufficient to meet the standard of 'sufficient relevant 
data' in the Consulting Services Standards" (emphasis added). 1 partially agree with Mr. Conway 
that the limited testing performed may not meet a higher standard of evidential matter in an audit 
engagement, however, I never have claimed to have performed sufficient test work to meet such a 
standard. I have consistently stated the opposite, that only a limited amount of testing had been 
done and more testing would be required! 
In conclusion, I strongly believe I have not violated professional standards and have not 
made any effort to deceive the Court in any way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Edwin L. Erickson, CPA 
ELE:cp 
cc: Stephen Tmgey 
Joseph Palmer 
Robert DeBry 
April 23, 2003 
Mr. Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Dear Bob: 
Your letter of April 8, 2003 asks six questions. My response is as follows: 
1. Difference between sample size of 400 and n-100. The original 
sample selected by Prudential was 100 items, generated on 
November 25, 1993. On January 5, 1994, an expanded sample of 
400 loans was generated. My recollection of the reason to increase 
the sample from 100 to 400 was due to the fact many of the loans 
selected from the microfiche were not potentially class members, 
since they were FHA, VA, construction, etc. type loans. The larger 
sample was necessary to obtain a representative number of 
conventional mortgages that would be potential class members. The 
statistical parameters quoted on page 3 of my March 1, 2002 report 
are based on the original sample of 100 which was subsequently 
increased to 400. The parameters for the sample of 400 are 
discussed in question 2 below. 
2. Estimate of aggregate damages of $1,004,152 per March L 2002 
report versus X-HAT of $1,608,639. As discussed above, 
Prudential's original statistical estimate based on a sample of 100 
resulted in an estimate of $1,608,639, with a precision of $392,059, 
resulting in an estimate range of $1,216,581 to $2,000,698 (See copy 
of sample summary sheet attached). This sample summary includes 
an interest component on the damages as well. As noted in our 
December 31, 1996 report, the interest component at 10% was 
$119.21 per class member, compared to damages of $105.18 per 
class member. As noted in the December 31, 1996 report, our total 
damage estimate (including interest) was $2,164,915. This amount 
compares to Prudential's statistical estimate of $1,888,070, with an 
estimated range of $1,675,577 to $2,100,563 (see iteration #6 on 
attached sample summary). The main difference between the sample 
estimate of $1,004,152 and the higher amounts estimated by 
Prudential and by myself is the interest component, which was 
excluded based on instructions from the Court for my March 1, 
2002 report. 
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3. Precision of $392,059 and X-HAT of $1,608,639. As discussed 
above, these sample parameters for the sample of 100 were picked up 
in error. The parameters should have been a precision of $212,493 
and an X-HAT of $1,888,070, based on the larger sample of 400. 
4. Testing of 14,482 data base of loan cards. In my March 1, 2002 
report to the Court, I stated,"! have not yet performed testing to 
determine if all loan cards have been properly segregated between 
class members and non-members of the class". As indicated in my 
December 27, 2000 letter to you, I met with Mr. Slack at that time 
and reviewed with him the process he followed to segregate the loan 
cards. He represented to me that he followed the criteria established 
by the Court in determining class members. Of course, as this 
matter progresses to the point where damages are distributed to class 
members, we will perform additional testing to confirm proper 
identification of class members and completeness of the data base. 
5. Request for data supporting average damage per loan of $105.18. I 
apologize for not responding to this request. I thought Mr. Shaha 
obtained this information when he met with Washington Mutual 
representatives and reviewed the sample. I have attached a copy of 
the five pages of the sample results. The totals at the bottom of the 
fourth page agree to our December 31, 1996 report. The fifth page 
totals include nonowner occupied loans such as thrift and loan 
entities, etc. which were excluded. As in the past, I have covered the 
names of the borrowers to preserve confidentiality. 
6. Testwork performed on Prudential sample. To test the sample 
performed by Prudential, we tested every 20th loan in the sample, or 
20 loans. For these 20 loans, we obtained the microfiche designated 
by the random number generator program and verified the proper 
loan was selected. We then obtained copies of the annual statement 
summaries for each of the 20 loans for each year end from 1971 to 
1979 for which the loan had activity. We then entered the monthly 
escrow balances into a spreadsheet, using the formulas established 
by the Court for the Madsen loan. We then compared the total 
damages, including interest, from our spreadsheet for these loans to 
the amount listed by Prudential in its sample summary. As 
discussed previously, we found two minor errors, one which changed 
the sample total slightly by $6.44. We revised the sample total 
prepared by Prudential by the $6.44 and concluded we could rely on 
the accuracy of the sample work performed by Prudential. 
Sincerely, 
Edwin L. Erickson, CPA 
cc: Stephen Tingey, Esq. 
Joseph Palmer, Esq. 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
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Of JUDQMENTS 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for themselves and all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK fsb 
(successor to PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL 




Civil No. C79-8404 
Honorable L. A. Dever 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that: 
L Judgment is entered against defendant Washington Mutual Bank fsb, successor to 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association in the amount of $1,004,153 as 
the total lump sum damages and in favor of Nancy Madsen, in her capacity as 
representative of a certified class of persons, similarly situated, consisting of the 
borrowers on the 9,547 loans identified by the Special Master comprising a class 
defined as borrowers (i) whose loan include a trust deed contaimng the pledge 
language as in the Madsens' Trust Deed, as identified by the Special Master; (li) 
who had any funds m escrow reserve budget accounts between March 3, 1971 and 
June 30, 1979; (iii) whose loan was for a single-family, owner-occupied, 
residential primary residence; (IV) whose loan originated in Utah; and (v) whose 
mailing address and property address are identical on the Mortgage Loan Master 
Reference Card, thereby establishing "primary residence." The actual names of 
class members can be provided to the appellate court by supplemental filing if so 
desired or requested by the appellate court. 
Final Judgment @J 
JD20293225 
750226073 WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 
M p t 2006 
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2. The amount of the foregoing aggregate judgment to be received by class members 
for each loan within the class is the cumulative net earnings on the average 
escrow balance for that class member's loan, compounded for the period March 3, 




















less attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel in the amount of 33.3% of the 
foregoing. 
3. Defendant Washington Mutual Bank fsb shall pay post-judgment interest, at the 
rate set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, from the date of this Judgment, until 
the amount of the aggregate is deposited in court, in cash or bond. 
4. Defendant Washington Mutual Bank fsb shall pay plaintiffs' costs to the extent 
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and as determined by the Court, in 
the amount of 
t<W t\ 
* 
DATED P X f c ^ V VN _,2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Wbea 4y^^r ****** 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on June 19th, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
FINAL JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to the following: 
Robert J. DeBry 
DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 




INTEREST ON MORTGAGE LOAN ACCOUNTS ACT 
(§ 7-17-1 etseq. U.C.A., as amended by 1985) 
7-17-1. Legislative intent. 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act govern the rights, duties 
and liabilities of borrowers and lenders with respect to reserve accounts established 
before and after the effective date of this act. 
7-17-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Real estate loan" means any agreement providing for a loan secured by an interest 
in real estate in this state containing a residential structure of not more than four housing 
units, at least one of which is the primary residence of the borrower and includes, but is 
not limited to, agreements secured by mortgages, trust deeds, and conditional land sales 
contracts. 
(2) "Borrower" means any person who becomes obligated on a real estate loan at the 
time of origination of such loan and includes mortgagors, trustors under trust deeds and 
vendees under conditional land sales contracts. 
(3) "Lender" means any person who regularly makes, extends or holds real estate loans 
and includes, but is not limited to, mortgagees, beneficiaries under trust deeds and 
vendors under conditional land sales contracts and who regularly require or maintain 
reserve accounts. 
(4) "Person" includes an individual, a commercial bank, savings bank, building and 
loan corporation, savings and loan association, credit union, investment company, 
insurance company, pension fund, mortgage company, trust company, or any other 
organization making real estate loans. 
(5) "Reserve account" means any account, whether denominated escrow, impound, 
trust, pledge, reserve or otherwise, which is established in connection with a loan secured 
by an interest in real estate located in this state, whether or not a real estate loan as 
defined in this chapter, and whether incorporated into the loan agreement or a separate 
document, whereby the borrower agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender or its 
designee of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining to the property 
securing the loan and the lender or its designee agrees to pay the taxes, insurance 
Premiums or other charges out of the account on or before their due date. 
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(6) "Service charge" means any direct fee imposed in connection with the 
administration of a reserve account. 
(7) A loan is "made" when the lender makes its initial disbursement of the loan 
proceeds. 
7-17-3. Lender to pay interest — Exceptions — Computation — Time for payment — 
Service charges prohibited — Written agreement. 
(1) Each lender requiring the establishment or continuance of a reserve account in 
connection with an existing or future real estate loan shall pay interest on funds deposited 
in the account of at least 5 1/4% simple interest per annum, unless: 
(a) The reserve account is required by a governmental insurer or guarantor of the loan 
as a condition of insurance or guaranty; 
(b) The reserve account is maintained in connection with a real estate loan in an 
original principal amount exceeding 80% of the lender's appraised value of the property at 
the time the loan is made provided that when the principal balance of the loan is paid 
down to 80% this exception shall not apply; or 
(c) The payment of interest or other compensation to the borrower for the use of funds 
deposited in a reserve account is prohibited by federal law or regulations. 
(2) The interest shall be computed as of the end of the calendar year on the average of 
the month end balances in the account for that calendar year or partial calendar year, 
except that in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, interest shall be computed on the 
average month end balances in the account for the partial year ending at the end of the 
month preceding payoff. The interest shall, within 60 days after the end of each calendar 
year, at the election of the lender, be credited to the remaining principal balance on the 
loan, paid to the borrower, his successors or assigns, or credited to the reserve account, 
except that in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, the interest shall be paid or 
credited to the borrower, his successors or assigns within 30 days after the date of payoff. 
(3) No lender shall require or impose a service charge for the administration of a reserve 
account. 
(4) Except as provided in this section, no lender shall be obligated to pay interest on or 
account for the earnings from funds in any reserve account in connection with the real 
estate loan made or held after June 30, 1979, unless an agreement in writing expressly so 
providing was executed by the borrower and lender. 
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7-17-4. Options in lieu of reserve account — Notice by lender — Selection by 
borrower — Noninterest-bearing reserve account. 
(1) A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance of a reserve account shall 
offer the borrower the following options: 
(a) The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing reserve account to be 
serviced by the lender at no charge to the borrower; or 
(b) The borrower may manage the payment of insurance premiums, taxes and other 
charges for his own account. 
(2) The lender shall give written notice of the options to the borrower: (i) with respect to 
real estate loans existing on the effective date by notice mailed not more than 30 days 
after the effective date; (ii) with respect to real estate loans made on or after the effective 
date by notice given at or prior to the closing of the loan. The notice shall clearly describe 
the options and state that a reserve account is not required by the lender, that the borrower 
is legally responsible for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums and other charges and 
that the notice is being given pursuant to this act. For real estate loans in existence on the 
effective date the borrower must select one of the options prior to 60 days after the 
effective date. If no option is selected prior to 60 days after the effective date the 
borrower will be deemed to have selected option (a), provided, however, that the 
borrower at a later time may select option (b). For loans made on or after the effective 
date the borrower shall select one of the options at the closing. If the borrower selects 
option (a), the lender shall not be required to account for earnings, if any, on the account. 
(3) If the borrower who selects option (b), or his successors or assigns, fails to pay the 
taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining to the property securing the loan 
prior to the delinquency date for such payments, the lender may require a reserve account 
without interest or other compensation for the use of the funds; provided, that the lender 
may not require a reserve account without interest or other compensation if (a) the 
borrower pays any delinquency within 30 days and (b) the borrower has not previously 
been delinquent in payment of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges. 
7-17-5. Statements. 
Every lender shall furnish to the borrower, or his successors or assigns, without charge, 
within 60 days after the end of each calendar year, an itemized statement showing moneys 
(1) received for interest and principal repayment and (2) received and held in or disbursed 
from a reserve account, if any. 
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7-17-6. Liability of lender for failure to pay taxes, insurance premiums or other 
charges. 
A lender administering a reserve account shall make timely payments of taxes, insurance 
premiums and other charges for which the account is established, if funds paid into the 
account by the borrower, his successors or assigns, are sufficient for the payments. 
Negligent failure to make the payments required for taxes, insurance premiums and other 
charges as they become due, from available funds in the reserve account, shall subject the 
lender to liability for all damages directly resulting from the failure; provided that this 
sentence shall not deprive the lender of the right to present any defense it may have in any 
action brought to enforce the liability. Failure of the borrower or his successors or assigns 
to deliver promptly to the lender all notices of tax assessments and insurance premiums or 
other charges, received by the borrower, his successors or assigns, shall relieve the lender 
from liability under this section. 
7-17-7. Limit on amount borrower required to pay into account — Deficiency — 
Method of recouping and remedies for default. 
No lender in connection with a real estate loan shall require a borrower, his successors 
or assigns, or a prospective borrower: 
(1) to deposit in any reserve account established in connection with the loan, prior to or 
upon closing, a sum exceeding the estimated total payments for taxes, insurance 
premiums or other charges which will be due and payable on the date of closing, and the 
pro rata portion thereof which has accrued, plus 1/12th of the estimated total taxes, 
insurance premiums and other charges which will become due and payable during the 
12-month period beginning on the date of closing; or 
(2) to deposit in any reserve account in any month beginning after closing a sum 
exceeding 1/12th of the total estimated taxes, insurance premiums, or other charges which 
will become due and payable during the 12-month period beginning on the first day of the 
month, except that: 
(a) If the lender determines there will be a deficiency on the due date, it may require 
additional monthly deposits in the reserve account of pro rata portions of the deficiency 
corresponding to the number of months from the date of the lender's determination of the 
deficiency to the date upon which the charges become due and payable; 
(b) If the lender determines there is a deficiency on or after the due date, it may bill the 
borrower, his successors or assigns, for the deficiency, which bill shall promptly be paid, 
or pay the deficiency, add that amount to the principal, or charge the reserve account, and 
require additional monthly deposits in the reserve account over the next 12 months to 
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recoup the deficiency. If the borrower, his successors or assigns, fails to pay any amount 
billed by the lender to meet the deficiency, the lender may exercise any remedies for 
default contained in the real estate loan document. If such failure to pay continues for 30 
days after written notice to borrower, the lender may also terminate any obligation to pay 
interest or to otherwise pay compensation for the use of the funds in the reserve account. 
7-17-8. Damages for lender's violation of act — Limitations on recovery. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a lender who violates this act is liable to the 
borrower, his successors or assigns, for the actual damages suffered by the borrower, his 
assigns or successors, or $100, whichever is greater. If an action is commenced, the 
prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court. 
(2) A lender has no liability under this section if the court finds that written demand for 
payment of the claim of the borrower, his successors or assigns, was made on the lender 
not less than 30 days before commencement of the action and that the lender tendered to 
the borrower, his successors or assigns, prior to the commencement of the action, an 
amount not less than the damages awarded. 
(3) A lender may not be held liable under this section for a violation of this act if the 
lender shows that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures to avoid such errors. 
(4) A reserve account established or maintained in violation of this act is voidable, at the 
option of the borrower, his successors or assigns, at any time, but shall not otherwise 
affect the validity of the loan, the security interest in the real property or any other 
obligation of the borrower. 
(5) No action under this section may be brought more than one year after the date of the 
violation. 
7-17-9. Actions on accounts established prior to 1979 — Limitations on recovery. 
(1) With respect to any reserve account established prior to July 1, 1979 and for which 
no legal action is pending as of January 1, 1979, no recovery shall be had in any action 
brought to require payment of interest on, or other compensation for, the use prior to July 
1, 1979, of the funds in such account unless: 
(a) An agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by the borrower and 
the lender; or 
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(b) The borrower, or his successors or assigns, establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence an agreement between the parties that the lender would pay interest on or to 
otherwise compensate the borrower for the use of the funds in such account. Use in the 
loan documents of such words as "trusf'or "pledge" alone shall not establish the intent of 
the parties; and 
(c) There is no federal law or regulation prohibiting the payment of interest on or 
otherwise compensating the borrower for the use of the funds in such an account. 
(2) No action seeking payment of interest on or other compensation for the use of the 
funds in any reserve account for any period prior to July 1, 1979, shall be brought after 
June 30, 1981. Any recovery in any such action shall be limited to the four-year period 
immediately preceding the commencement of the action. No recovery shall be had in 
respect of any reserve account established prior to July 1, 1979 greater than if the 
provisions of Section 7-17-3 of this act were applicable to such accounts. 
(3) With respect to any reserve account established prior to July 1, 1979, an agreement 
in writing between the lender and the borrower, or his successors or assigns, that (a) the 
provisions of Section 7-17-3 of this act shall apply to all payments made subsequent to 
July 1, 1979, or (b) the borrower may exercise, for the period subsequent to July 1, 1979, 
either of the options provided in Section 7-17-4 of this act, shall bar any recovery by the 
borrower, his successors or assigns, for interest on or other compensation for the use of 
the funds in such account for any period prior to July 1, 1979. 
7-17-10. Applicability of act to accounts and actions thereon. 
The provisions of this act shall apply: 
(1) to all reserve accounts; and 
(2) to all actions filed after January 1, 1979, to recover interest on or other 
compensation for the use of the funds in any reserve account whether or not the reserve 
accounts were established prior to or subsequent to July 1, 1979. 
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